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Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 9

STEALING HOME IN HOLLYWOOD: WHY THE TAKEOVER
OF THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS ILLUSTRATES THE
UNJUST NATURE OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
"To put it mildly and with restraint, it would be unfortunate indeed if a
fine sport and profession, which brings surceasefrom daily travail and
an escape from the ordinary to most inhabitants of this land, were to suffer in the least because of undue concentration by any one or any group
on commercial and profit considerations. The game is on higher ground;
it behooves everyone to keep it there."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nobody likes Frank McCourt. 2 Los Angeles Dodgers fans want
him gone, his wife divorced him, and Major League Baseball
("MLB") has seemingly tried everything to replace him as the
owner of the Dodgers.3 On April 20, 2011, MLB Commissioner
Bud Selig seized control of the Dodgers and appointed Tom Schieffer to monitor the day-to-day operations of the franchise.4 This
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (placing importance
of baseball above any one person, group, or organization).
2. See Doug Mead, Los Angeles Dodgers: 5 Reasons for Owner Frank McCourt to
Walk Away Quietly, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 21, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/672922-los-angeles-dodgers-5-reasons-for-owner-frank-mccourt-to-quietlywalk-away (mentioning why MLB, fans, and owners want Los Angeles Dodger's
owner Frank McCourt gone from baseball).
3. See id. (discussing why MLB dislikes McCourt due to his publicizing moneydriven aspect of baseball, contrary to popular image that baseball is purely for
sport). One commentator hypothesized that MLB hates McCourt because he revealed "the ordinariness of baseball as a business - one where people are in it for,
well - the money." See Tom Gallagher, Why Does Baseball Hate Dodger Owner Frank
McCourt?, COMMON DREAMs (July 5, 2011), http://www.commondreams.org/view/
2011/07/05-2 (arguing that MLB does not want to broadcast that business of baseball revolves around money); see also Bill Shaikin, Frank andJamie McCourt Reach
Settlement Involving Dodgers, L.A. TIMEs (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/
sports/la-sp-1017-mccourt-divorce-settlement-2011101 7 ,0,2826184.story (reporting
on McCourt's finalized divorce where Frank retains sole ownership of Dodgers, but
must give Jamie $130 million in return for her giving up ownership interest).
Frank McCourt is required to pay his wife "$225,000 in temporary spousal support
until the lump-sum payment is made." See Frank McCourt to Pay Ex-Wife $131M,
ESPN (Nov. 4, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/mlb/story/_/id/
7187451/frank-mccourt-pay-131m-divorce-settlement (discussing McCourt's divorce settlement with his wife).
4. See PREss RELEASE, MLB, MLB Statement Regarding the Dodgers, MLB.com
(Apr. 20, 2011, 5:04 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/press-releases/press-release.jsp?ymd=20110420&contentjid=1 8038724&vkey=pr..mlb&fext=jsp&c-id=

(785)
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Hollywood drama intensified on June 17, 2011, when Frank and
Jamie McCourt agreed to a divorce settlement contingent on MLB
approving a proposed $2.7 billion, 17-year television deal with Fox
Sports.5 Bud Selig rejected the deal, however, with the support of
other baseball owners, "citing the 'best interests of baseball' clause
in the MLB Constitution."6 These unprecedented legal maneuvers
by Bud Selig reveal the absolute and unchecked power wielded by
the commissioner of MLB. 7
mlb (describing why MLB is assuming control of Dodgers' day-to-day operations);
see also, Eric Morath, Dodgers:Selig Targets L.A. Team as FansDie Elsewhere, WALL ST. J.
(July 18, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2011/07/18/dodgersselig-targets-l-a-team-as-fans-die-elsewhere/ (commenting on beating of San Francisco Giant's fan, Bryan Stow, at Chavez Ravine and how Selig treated this situation
much more aggressively than incidents at other parks that were arguably worse);
see also Marie-Andrde Weiss, Take Me Out to the Courts: the Los Angeles Dodgers Filefor
Bankruptcy, Er., ARTS, AND SPORTS L. BLOG (July 1, 2011, 8:24 AM), http://nysbar.
com/blogs/EASL/2011/07/take me-outtothecourtsthe.html (discussing
Bud Selig's opinion that Dodger takeover was in "best interest" of baseball).
5. See Weiss, supra note 4 (noting lucrative television offer from Fox in connection with background drama of divorce proceedings). The McCourts eventually finalized their divorce in October 2011. See Steve Dilbeck, Judge to Frank and
Jamie McCourt: 'Good Luck to You', L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://la
timesblogs.latimes.com/dodgers/2012/01/judge-to-frank-andjamie-mccourtgood-luck.html (discussing how McCourt divorce finally settled after over $20 million spent, perhaps most expensive divorce in California history). Frank will reportedly have to pay Jamie $130 million, but will receive her promise to withdraw
any opposition to the sale of the Dodger's media rights. See Greg Risling, McCourts
Reach Settlement in Divorce Battle, Bus. WK. (Oct. 18, 2011, 8:28 AM), http://www.
(detailing McCourt dibusinessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9QEN1R83.htm
vorce settlement).
6. See MLB Const. art. II, § 2, cl. b., available at http://www.bizofbaseball.
com/docs/MLConsititutionjune2005Update.pdf (quoting language which gives
Commissioner absolute power over baseball so long as actions are within "best interests of . .. baseball"); see also Tim Brown, Selig vs. Dodgers' McCourt is 29 Against
One, YAHoo! SPORTs (Apr. 22, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=tibrownmccourt selig-dodgers-foxtelevision soboroff owners_042111 (citing "rival team executive" who warns McCourt that Selig has support of other baseball
owners); see generally Weiss, supra note 4 (detailing Selig's decision to solely veto
deal and prevent McCourt from receiving financing based upon MLB Constitutional authority). Bud Selig argued that McCourt was planning to use a portion of
the money from the television deal to pay off his divorce. See David Wharton, Denial of TV Deal FurtherChokes Dodgers' Cash Flow; Team Is Closer Than Ever to a Change
in Ownership After Commisioner's Action, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at 1 (alleging
financial mismanagement as reason for rejecting Fox contract with McCourt).
7. See Mead, supra note 2 (noting that no other commissioner has taken over
baseball franchise for complete financial mismanagement); see Lester Munson, The
Death Penalty' and the Dodgers, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2011), http://espn.go.com/espn/
commentary/story/_/page/munson-1 10930/mlb-shows-powerful-hand-dodgersdispute (explaining how Selig threatened to use death penalty provision against
McCourt for first time in MLB history). Frank McCourt defended his ownership
rights after the takeover and vetoed television deal by stating:
I'm here to continue to run this club . .. and I think it is wrong - fundamentally wrong - for any one person to stand in the way of a sound
business transaction, which I and my organization have every right to
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Without money from the proposed Fox Sports television deal,
McCourt filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on June 27,
2011.8 The judge ordered McCourt to accept a loan from MLB instead of contracting with Highbridge Principal Strategic, a third
party hedge fund.9 After using the loan to pay creditors and establish cash reserves, McCourt requested to auction the team's television rights even though Fox Sports maintained it was granted an
exclusivity agreement with the Dodgers for the rights through November 2012.10 In response, MLB and Bud Selig made their unwillingness to approve any sale of television rights that would help
McCourt retain ownership of the team vividly clear." Once it reenter into .

. .

. [It is] not appropriate for one person's property to be

seized by someone else just because he got divorced or for some arbitrary
reason.
Richard Sandomir, McCourt Criticizes Takeover of Dodgers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011,
at B14 (criticizing arbitrariness of MLB decision to take over Dodgers and veto Fox
deal).
8. See Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy at 1, In re Los Angeles Dodgers
LLC, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/dodgers.
pdf (filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection); see also Press Release, MLB, MLB
Statement RegardingDodgersChapter11 Filing,MLB (Jun. 27, 2011, 4:59 PM), http://
mlb.mlb.com/news/press releases/press-releasejsp?ymd=20110627&content id=
21076822&vkey=pr._mlb&fext=jsp&c-id=mlb (quoting Allan H. Selig disapproving
of McCourt's actions and expressing concern for future of Dodger's franchise).
Frank McCourt argues that Selig's veto of the Fox television contract and rejection
of loans forced him to seek bankruptcy protection. See Richard Sandomir, Terms of
Loan from Baseball Ease Dodgers' Fear of Seizure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at D2
(describing how Judge Gross forced Dodgers to agree to loan with MLB and why
McCourt blames Selig for getting him in this position).
9. Seeln re L.A. Dodgers LLC, No. 11-12010(KG), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2781, at
*10-11 (Bankr. Del.July 22, 2011) (holding that Dodgers must negotiate with MLB
"in good faith" and that MLB loan must "not be vehicle to control [Dodgers]"); see
Steve Dilbeck, FrankMcCourt v. MLB: Stamina and Patienceoffob Required, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://atimesblogs.latimes.com/dodgers/2011/09/
frank-mccourt-vs-mlb-stamina-and-patience-of-job-required.html (noting that $150
million loan MLB gave McCourt is now being used to fund McCourt's legal battle
against MLB).
10. See Dodgers Ask Courtfor Rules for TV Rights Auction, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 16,
2011), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/story/15591040/dodgers-ask-court-forrules-for-tv-rights-auction (describing McCourt's attempts to auction TV rights of
Dodgers to receive $175 million "cash cushion"); see also Richard Sandomir, TV's
Supporting Role in Dodgers'Drama,N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2011, at D2 (highlighting pivotal and predominant role TV industry plays in financing MLB).
11. See Bill Shaikin, Baseball:MLB Asks for Sale of Dodgers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2011, at 1 (detailing MLB's efforts to run McCourt out of league and its refusal to
grant any television deals for McCourt); see also MLB Goes for the KO against McCourt, ALLOFBASEBALL (Sept. 23, 2011), http://allofbaseball.wordpress.com/2011 /
09/23/mlb-goes-for-the-ko-against-mccourt/ (discussing MLB's intention not to
approve any television contracts for McCourt); see Brief for MLB at 35, In re L.A.
Dodgers LLC, No. 11-12010 (KG), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2781, at *1 (Bankr. Del.July
22, 2011), availableat http://www.scribd.com/doc/66102703/MLB-Motion-to-Terminate (stating that MLB will not approve any television contract because it would
"not be in the best interests of [d]ebtors, [MLB], or ... other MLB clubs.").
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ceived word McCourt was attempting to auction the television
rights to a third party, Fox Sports sued the Dodgers for breach of
contract.12 Frank McCourt found himself in a precarious position;
fighting two powerful opponents with deep pockets and crafty
lawyers.' 3
As a victim of his own creation, McCourt will garner little, if
any, sympathy from the public or the press.' 4 Regardless, his selfcreated battle highlights not only MLB's overly-aggressive efforts to
dethrone him, but most notably, Bud Selig's absolute power and
authority over all dealings pertaining to the "business of baseball."1 5
Selig's statement that he plans to veto any television contract illustrates the arbitrary and totalitarian control he exerts over the
sport.16 As one sports attorney stated, "by [MLB] announcing its

12. See Tom Hals, Fox Sues Dodgers to Stop Possible TVRights Sale, REUTERS (Sept.
28, 2011, 11:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/28/us-dodgersfox-idUSTRE78R1XY20110928 (describing Fox's lawsuit against McCourt for
breach of contract, alleging any attempt by him to sell TV Rights of Dodgers is in
violation of their exclusivity agreement); see Edvard Pettersson & Steven Church,
Fox Sports Sues Dodgers to Block Possible Media-Rights Sale, Bus. WK. (Sept. 28, 2011,
12:52 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-28/fox-sports-sues-dodgers-to-block-possible-media-rights-sale.html (indicating Fox's intention to prevent
potential sale of Dodger's future television rights to third party).
13. See Hals, supra note 12 (noting that McCourt is battling MLB to maintain
control of Dodgers as he starts this fight with Fox over television rights); see
Sandomir, supra note 10 (acknowledging Fox's dependency on Dodgers for lucrative investment opportunity and inclination to team up with MLB against
McCourt).
14. See Debt was Burying Dodgers' Owner before Takeover, SFGATE (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-04-22/sports/295934941 vice-chairman-stevesoboroff-major-league-constitution-selig (noting financial turmoil McCourt found
himself in prior to Dodger takeover by MLB). McCourt had difficulty procuring
loans for the Dodgers' operating expenses and owed around $457 million. See id.
(giving overview of McCourt's finances).
15. See Richard Sandomir, Slow Creep of the 'Best Interests' Clause, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2010, at D6 (describing ever-expanding scope of "best interests" clause
and "business of baseball" under reign of Bud Selig); see also Bill Rochelle, Dodgers,
Solyndra, Viceroy, Innkeepers, Lehman: Bankruptcy, Bus. WK. (Oct. 3, 2011, 9:33 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-03/dodgers-solyndra-viceroy-innkeepers-lehman-bankruptcy.html (stating bankruptcy judge's opinion on Bud Selig's actions in this case). Kevin Gross, the bankruptcy judge, characterized Selig's
assertion of power over the Los Angeles Dodgers as "nearly unparalleled in the
business world." See id. (quoting Kevin Gross).
16. See Shaikin, supra note 11 (discussing Selig's plans to veto any television
contract for McCourt's Dodgers); see Craig Calcaterra, MLB's Takeover of the Dodgers
Could Imperil Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, NBC SPORTS (Apr. 22, 2011, 9:11 AM),
http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/04/22/one-silver-lining-about-the-mlb(describing
takeover-of-the-dodgers-it-could-imperil-baseballs-antitrust-exemption
anticompetitive club ownership rules that would not likely survive legal challenge).
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rejection of any television deal before an auction could take place
... the league could be seen as not acting in good faith."17
On November 1, 2011, McCourt finally succumbed to MLB's
pressures and agreed to sell the Los Angeles Dodgers.' 8 The agreement called for both the sale of the team and its media rights by
April 30, 2012.19 The Dodgers and MLB resolved the media rights
issue on January 11, 2012 when a Delaware Bankruptcy judge approved settlement terms between the Dodgers and Fox Sports, requiring the Dodgers to abide by the terms of their existing contract
with Fox.2 0 The existing contract prevents the Dodgers' ownership
from talking to other potential buyers until its exclusive negotiating
period with Fox ends on November 30, 2012.21 This exclusive ne17. See Shaikin, supra note 11 (quoting lawyer Thomas Salerno and considering whether Selig is acting unreasonably by refusing to approve any television contract for Dodgers). Bud Selig's totalitarian power and ability to use aggressive
attempts to run McCourt out of the league stem from his "wide, virtually nonreviewable latitude to regulate any aspect of the game, including ownership interests." See Michael McCann, Options Vary for McCourt, Selig, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Apr. 25, 2011, 6:08 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/
michael_mccann/04/21/mccourtselig/index.html (referring to "best interests of
baseball" clause and how it allows Selig to act with essentially unchecked power).
18. See Bill Shaikin, MLB Agreement says Frank McCourt Must Sell Dodgers by End
of April, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/07/
sports/la-sp-1208-dodgers-mlb-20111208-9 [hereinafter Shaikin I] (detailing outline of agreement McCourt made with MLB on November 1, 2011). Frank McCourt still has authority to decide what to do with the parking lots surrounding
Dodger Stadium since he subdivided the real estate and the property is not connected to his ownership of the team. See id. (discussing McCourt's options with
parking lots and how he could make $10 million in annual profits by retaining
them); see also Bill Shaikin, Frank McCourt Might Be Able to Claim Stadium and Land
Even If He Loses Dodgers, L.A. Times (May 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/
2011/may/07/sports/la-sp-0508-dodgers-mccourt-sale-20110508 (describing how
McCourt subdivided Dodger assets into separate companies, making him new
owner's potential landlord).
19. See Shaikin I, supra note 18. (noting deadline McCourt must meet for selling Dodgers). Although it is not entirely clear what made Frank McCourt concede
defeat in his legal battle with Bud Selig, the Dodgers' attorneys contend that "Selig
deliberately starved the club of cash and destroyed its reputation in a bid to seize
control of the team and force its sale." See Tony Jackson, Frank McCourt to Sell
Dodgers, ESPN (Nov. 2, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/mlb/
story/_/id/7180599/frank-mccourt-agrees-sell-los-angeles-dodgers (analyzing reasons for McCourt's settlement with MLB).
20. See Ken Gurnick, Judge Approves Dodgers, FOX Agreement, MLB (Jan. 11,
2012, 11:30 AM), http://osangeles.dodgers.mlb.com/news/article.jspymd=2012
0111&contentid=26310154&vkey=newsla&cid=la (describing Bankruptcy Judge
Kevin Gross' decision to approve settlement, allowing any new owner opportunity
to "auction the future broadcasting rights after the 2013 season or develop a regional channel to televise games.").
21. See Randall Chase, Judge OKs Settlement between Dodgers, Fox Sports, BoSTON.
com (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/articles/2012/01/
11 /dodgers settle withfoxabandon media-rights-sale/ (noting exclusive negotiation clause in contract between Fox and Dodgers). Although the exclusive ne-
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gotiating period runs for 45 days beginning in October 2012, providing Fox with the opportunity to negotiate a media rights
contract extension with the Dodgers before any competitors have
the chance to submit offers.2 2 Moreover, this settlement paved the
way for McCourt to sell the franchise by the April 30 deadline he
agreed to with MLB. 2 3 Previously, McCourt insisted that the Dodgers' media rights needed to be bundled with the sale of the team to
maximize the value of the sale, but he reversed this course after
District CourtJudge Leonard Stark held that the prior approval for
marketing the media rights process would not stand on appeal. 2 4
Therefore, in an attempt to meet the deadline and to maximize the
value of the Dodgers' franchise, Frank McCourt agreed to settle for
the original terms of the agreement with Fox and not shop the media rights to other potential buyers. 2 5McCourt's settlement with Fox
did not detrimentally affect the sale of the Dodgers to say the least,
as a group led by Magic Johnson bought the franchise for a record
shattering $2.15 billion on March 27, 2012.26 This astronomical
sale price, inflated from the skyrocketing price of television contracts in the lucrative Los Angeles media market, nets McCourt an
$860 million profit after paying off various expenses, debts, and divorce payments to his wife.2 7
gotiating period ends in November 2012, the existing broadcasting agreement
with Fox runs through the 2013 season. See Gurnick, supra note 20 (explaining
broadcast agreement between Dodgers and Fox).
22. See Chase, supra note 21 (noting length of Fox's exclusive negotiating
period).
23. See id. (describing how stay on Fox's appeal threatened plans to sell Dodgers by April 30, but settlement provided viable solution for McCourt). Even with a
new media contract prior to the sale of the team "[a] new owner will need to invest
$250 million to $400 million in the outdated Dodgers Stadium, making it hard ...
to attract upward of $1.1 billion. SeeJosh Kosman, Foul Call on Dodgers, N.Y. PosT,
Dec. 24, 2012, at 25 (discussing how "[w]ithout new media contract, the Dodgers
are potentially less valuable" and it will be harder for McCourt to collect money he
needs to pay off debts).
24. See Chase, supra note 21 (explaining why McCourt changed his litigation
strategy and agreed to settle). Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross had previously ruled
that the "no shop" exclusivity provisions were unenforceable in bankruptcy, and
consequently, he moved the exclusive negotiating period forward by about ten
months. See id. (reporting on judge's holding).
25. See id. (noting Dodgers' reasons for settling with Fox).
26. See Matthew Futterman, $2 Billion Dodgers Price Tag Shatters Records, WALL
ST.J., Mar. 29, 2012, at BI, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424
052702303404704577308483250633906.html?mod=WSJ-hpLEFTWhatsNewsCollection (detailing "100% cash offer" made by Magic Johnson led group to buy
Dodgers' franchise from Frank McCourt).
27. See Brian Solomon, Baseball Bandit: Frank McCourt Escapes Dodgers with $860
Million Profit, FoRBES, (Mar. 28, 2012, 10:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
briansolomon/2012/03/28/baseball-bandit-frank-mccourt-escapes-dodgers-with860-million-profit/ (calculating McCourt's net profit on sale of Dodgers). "From
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While many people despise Frank McCourt for his financial
mismanagement of the franchise and the unnecessary drama he
brought to the city of Los Angeles with his high-profile divorce, the
negative public opinion against McCourt does not excuse Bud Selig's actions.28 No other Commissioner, in any sports league, has
acted in such a totalitarian fashion. 2 9 The strong-armed tactics, aggressive litigation strategies, and arbitrary decisions used by Selig in
the "best interests of baseball" all occurred in the foreground of a
judicially-created antitrust exemption that has existed in baseball
for almost 90 years. 30 This exemption keeps MLB almost completely judgment proof under antitrust laws. 3 ' Only one other
owner in the history of baseball attempted to challenge the commissioner under antitrust laws, and he lost in favor of the commissioner's "broad authority" to determine what is in the "best
bankruptcy to near-billionaire, it will only take a few good investments to bump
this baseball bandit onto our Forbes 400 Richest Americans list." Id. The high
price for the Dodgers comes with the unique opportunity to start a regional sports
network in the second-largest media market in the country. See Matthew Futterman, Behind DodgersDeal: TV Riches, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2012, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023041771045773098607506377
58.html?mod=WSJ-hpLEFTopStories (describing reasons for high-priced sale of
Dodgers).
28. See Dan Weikel, McCourt Uphill Fight to Win Back the Dodgers, L.A. TimES
Apr. 22, 2011, at 1 (reporting on public scorn of McCourt, and on possibility that
McCourt could argue that Selig's actions were "arbitrary and capricious.").
29. See David Wharton, Commissioners Walk a Fine Line, L.A. TIMES, May 15,
2011, at 1 (recounting history of commissioners in sports leagues and their relationships with owners). Horace Fogel, owner of the Philadelphia Phillies in 1912,
is the only owner ever to be forced out of an ownership position in any sports
league. See id. (noting ousting of Phillies owner, Horace Fogel). He was banned
for his repeated criticisms of umpires in MLB. See id. (explaining reason why Horace Fogel was forced out as owner of the Phillies). Bud Selig has been notorious
for expanding the scope of the commissioner's power ever since becoming commissioner in 1992. SeeJacob F. Lamme, Comment, The Twelve Year Rain Delay: Why
a Change in Leadership Will Benefit the Game of Baseball 68 ALB. L. REv. 155, 179-80
(2004) (listing expanding power of commissioner's office under Selig and radical
changes he has made).
30. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'1 Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (excluding baseball from force and effect of federal antitrust laws); see also McCann, supra note 17 (noting strength of MLB's antitrust exemption and its effect on discouraging owners from suing MLB and
commissioner).
31. See Michael J. Mozes & Ben Glicksman, Adjusting the Stream? Analyzing Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption After American Needle, 2 HARv. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 265, 269-70 (2011) (presenting history of baseball's antitrust exemption
and how it prevents baseball from being subjected to federal antitrust laws). While
some judges even referred to previous cases that carved out the exemption as
"anomalies" only "confined to baseball," . . . "the Court has never definitively removed the exemption." See id. (explaining persistence of MLB's antitrust
exemption).
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interests" of baseball. 32 Aside from Bud Selig, no other commissioner in any sports league has ever threatened to remove an owner
who is arguably in compliance with league rules.3 3
The following comment suggests: (1) Bud Selig can act in an
unreasonable, arbitrary, and overly aggressive manner against people he wants out of MLB because of the unchecked freedom the
antitrust exemption gives him; (2) if McCourt chose to challenge
Selig's authority instead of agreeing to sell the team, then he probably could prevail in an antitrust suit against MLB and Selig; and (3)
MLB's problems could be judicially or congressionally solved by
abolishing the exemption in favor of the rule of law, economic efficiency, and greater uniformity. 3 4
Part II of this comment will detail the history of the antitrust
exemption in baseball, the power it provides for commissioners like
Bud Selig, and the elements Frank McCourt would need to prove to
establish a viable antitrust suit against MLB if he chose to challenge
the league's attempts to revoke his ownership rights. 3 5 Part III will
analyze whether Frank McCourt would have a viable antitrust claim
against MLB and Bud Selig.3 6 Part IV will advocate for abolishing
the antitrust exemption in baseball to force MLB to adhere to the
rule of law, to make the league more economically efficient, and to
provide greater uniformity and accountability to prevent another
quarrel between an owner and the commissioner.3 7 Finally, Part V
will provide concluding remarks, advocating a uniform and fair application of antitrust laws to all industries, including MLB, and why
32. See Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, Inc., 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir.
1978) (upholding commissioner's power to rule in "best interests of baseball" and
that it is not up to courts to decide whether commissioner is right or wrong); see
also McCann, supra note 17 (noting Oakland Athletics owner's attempt to sell the
contracts of his star players and why commissioner thought it would "harm the
competitive balance of league . . . .").
33. See Charles 0. Finley, 569 F.2d at 539 (challenging commissioner's restraint
on trade, but was never forced out of MLB by commissioner); see also Wharton,
supra note 29 (discussing unprecedented nature of completely removing owner's
rights to own professional franchise).
34. For general discussion of content and argument, see infta notes 39-236.
35. For a history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, how it applies to MLB, and
what is required for a viable antitrust claim, see infra notes 39-132 and accompanying text.
36. For an analysis of a potential antitrust suit Frank McCourt could bring
against MLB if he chose to challenge his removal from ownership of the Dodgers,
see infra notes 133-197 and accompanying text.
37. For an examination of the potential benefits that could derive from abolishing baseball's antitrust exemption, see infra notes 198-228 and accompanying
text. This section will also take into account counterarguments in favor of the
exemption.
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this is in the best interests of baseball, the owners, players, and most
importantly, the fans.3 8

II.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRusT EXEMPTION

A.

Historical Background

The business of baseball dates back to 1903.39 After the "Black
Sox" scandal broke in 1919, baseball owners agreed to create the
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and vest in the Commissioner the "broad power" to act in the "best interests" of baseball. 40
One year after the agreement in 1922, the Supreme Court held in a
landmark case, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs,4 1 that MLB has an exemption

from federal antitrust regulation. 4 2 The case involved a baseball
club, who along with seven other teams, was a member of the Federal League that attempted to compete with the combined defendants that made up MLB at the time.4 3 The plaintiff claimed that the
38. For concluding remarks and reasons why abolishing the exemption is in
the "best interests" of all parties, see infra notes 229-236 and accompanying text.
39. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 159-60 (describing 1903 National Agreement's unprecedented nature, how it started MLB, and created business of baseball). Some baseball historians place the origins of modem baseball in 1842,
beginning with the New York Knickerbocker Base Ball Club. See Michael J.
Haupert, The Economic History of Major League Baseball, EH.NET (Feb. 2, 2010, 5:21
PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/haupert.mlb (declaring game of baseball originated and evolved from 1842 onwards). See also World Series History, BASEBALL ALMANAc (last visited Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.baseball-almanac.com/ws/
wsmenu.shtml (recognizing that 1903 agreement produced "business blueprint for
[MLB] result[ing] in ... merger that has lasted to this day.").
40. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 163 (explaining how owners disregarded
democratic structure in favor of possibility of despotism by implementing "best
interests" clause into 1921 Major League Agreement). Mr. Lamme describes the
"best interests" clause as giving the Commissioner "sole authority to regulate and
punish any act that he deemed 'detrimental to the best interests of the national
game of baseball.'" Id. (quoting 1921 Major League Agreement, art.I, § 2(a), 3
available at http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=58:1921-major-league-agreemen&catid=37:1900-1960&Itemid=47 (last visited Sept. 11, 2011)); see also Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports League
Commissioners'Authorityand Collective Bargaining,11 TEx. REv. ENr. & SPORTS L. 179,
183-84 (2010) (describing how baseball owners consolidated power in one commissioner after reality of Black Sox scandal ruined public confidence of game).
The Black Sox scandal involved eight members of the Chicago White Sox franchise
who were found to have conspired with gamblers to intentionally lose games in the
1919 World Series against the Cincinnati Reds. See Black Sox Scandal, BASEBALLREFERENCE (last visited Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/BlackSox -Scandal (detailing history of Black Sox scandal).
41. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
42. See id. at 209 (holding that "personal effort, not related to production, is
not a subject of commerce," thus baseball is not subject to federal regulation).
43. See id. at 207 (explaining attempted competition between Federal League
and MLB).
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"defendants destroyed the Federal' League by buying up some of
the constituent clubs and in one way or another inducing all those
clubs except the plaintiff to leave their League."4 4 Instead of discussing the antitrust implications of these actions, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes held that the business of "giving exhibitions of
base ball ... are purely state affairs." 4 5 He reasoned that paying
baseball players to cross state lines to engage in these exhibitions
amounted to "personal effort, not related to production" and consequently, baseball was not interstate commerce subject to federal
regulation under the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act").46
This landmark decision was only the beginning of a tumultuous history of uncertain precedents, contradicting opinions, and inconsistent analyses regarding baseball's antitrust exemption.4 7
Approximately thirty years after the Court's decision in Federal
Baseball, the Court revisited baseball's antitrust exemption in Toolson v. New York Yankees. 48 Emphasizing the fact that Congress had
abstained from acting on the judicially-created exemption, the
Court concluded that any change in regulation must come from
Congress instead of the judiciary.4 9 Consequently, the Court upheld baseball's sweeping antitrust exemption, finding it to encompass the entire "business of baseball."5 0
The next and final time the Supreme Court ruled on baseball's
antitrust exemption came almost twenty years later in Flood v.
44. See id. at 207 (detailing plaintiffs claim that defendants were engaged in
conspiracy to destroy Federal League).
45. Id. at 208 (quoting Holmes, J.).
46. See id. at 208-09 (discussing why baseball does not violate Sherman Act).
47. For a discussion of the history of baseball's antitrust exemption, see
Jonathan D. Gillerman, Comment, Calling Their Shots: Miffed Minor Leaguers, the
Steroid Scandal, and Examining the Use of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to Hold MLB
Accountable, 73 ALB. L. REV. 541, 565-70 (2010) (detailing historical background of
baseball's antitrust exemption and inconsistency with current state of antitrust exemption); see also Thomas J. Ostertag, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Its History and
ContinuingImportance, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 54, 54-66 (2004) (giving historical
accounts of baseball's antitrust exemption and arguing for its broad scope in application to federal antitrust laws). For a discussion of recent effects on the exemption from the evolution of case law, see Mozes & Glicksman, supranote 31, at 28890 (discussing impact American Needle has on antitrust jurisprudence as applied to
professional sports).
48. 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (finding that any change in MLB's antitrust exemption status must first come from Congress, not courts).
49. See id. at 357 ("The business has thus been left for thirty years to develop,
on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation.").
50. See id. at 357; see also Ostertag, supra note 47, at 58 (noting that Toolson
Court defined scope of antitrust exemption as encompassing entire "business of
baseball").
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Kuhn.5 Curt Flood, a major league baseball player, filed an antitrust lawsuit challenging the existence of MLB's reserve system,
which allowed Flood's team, the St. Louis Cardinals, to trade him to
the Philadelphia Phillies without his consent.52 The Court, however, found Mr. Flood's antitrust claim unpersuasive, especially
when considering the significant passage of time without congressional action since the original precedent set in Federal Baseball.5 3
While the Court upheld baseball's antitrust exemption, much
confusion followed this case primarily because many argued that
the Court limited the scope of FederalBaseball and Toolson when stating, "[w]ith its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal
antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and
an anomaly."5 4 Subsequent courts and scholars widely disagreed on
the scope and meaning of Flood and whether it narrowed the exemption solely to MLB's reserve clause.5 5
51. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (holding that any change in baseball's antitrust exemption is for Congress and that state antitrust laws do not apply
to baseball). In the last paragraph of the opinion, Justice Blackmun stated, "And
what the Court said in Federal Baseball in 1922 and what it said in Toolson in 1953,
we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if any is indicated, is for congressional, and
not judicial, action." Id. at 285 (reaffirming judgments of Federal Baseball and
Toolson).
52. See id. at 264-65 (noting that Flood asked Commissioner to bargain with
other major league teams, but his request was denied); see also Ostertag, supra note
47, at 60 (recognizing that existence of antitrust exemption and MLB "reserve system permitted . .. [Cardinals to trade Flood] without his consent.").
53. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (stating that aberration of baseball's antitrust
exemption has lasted for half century and is fully entitled to stare decisis). The
court's stare decisis justification "rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs." See id. at 282 (justifying why baseball is
exempt from antitrust laws while other professional sports are not).
54. See id. at 282 (emphasis added) (specifying that reserve system of MLB
enjoys exemption from federal antitrust laws as opposed to entire "business of
baseball"); Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MAuM ENT. & SPORTS
L. REv. 169, 184 (1994) (discussing consequences of interpreting Flood v. Kuhn
with limiting scope solely to MLB's reserve clause).
55. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 568 ("Without any direction from the Supreme Court as to how broadly or narrowly the 'unique characteristics and needs'
language should be construed, this inquiry has been left to the unfettered discretion of the lower courts."). For cases and commentary that interpret the exemption as limited to the reserve clause or nonexistent altogether, see Piazza v. Major
League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that exemption
created by FederalBaseball is inapplicable because it is limited to baseball's 'reserve
system'); see Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Hous. Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 270
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (finding that broadcasting rights are not subject to baseball's antitrust exemption because broadcasting is not central to baseball in "the way in
which players, umpires, the league structure, and the reserve system are"); Butterworth v. Nat'l League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994)
(holding that MLB's antitrust exemption extends only to reserve system); Charles
Matthew Bums, The Scope of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 24 STETSON
L. REv. 495, 532-34 (1995) (advocating that Piazza correctly interpreted Floodin its
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Congress finally spoke on the issue in 1998 with the passage of
the Curt Flood Act ("Flood Act"), but neglected to state what activities were still subject to the antitrust exemption.56 Instead, the
Flood Act only eliminated a narrow category of exempted issues "directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball
players to play baseball at the major league level."5 7 Therefore,
what falls under the umbrella of MLB's antitrust exemption remains open to judicial interpretation.5 8
use of stare decisis to limit exemption to reserve clause); Mitchell Nathanson, The
Irrelevance of Baseball'sAntitrust Exemption: A HistoricalReview, 58 RUTGERs L. REv. 1,
5-6 (2005) (discussing Toolson and Flood's focus solely on reserve clause, and uncertainty in precedent because of no analysis regarding scope of exemption); Martin
M. Tomlinson, The Commissioner's New Clothes: The Myth of Major League Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 255, 309 (2008) (arguing that revocation of reserve clause exemption from Flood Act completely demolished existence
of MLB antitrust exemption). For cases and commentary that interpreted Flood
broadly, see Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir. 1978)
(holding that baseball's antitrust exemption applies broadly to "business of baseball"). The Court attempted to clarify the scope of MLB's antitrust exemption
when stating:
Despite the two references in the Flood case to the reserve system, it appears clear from the entire opinions in the three baseball cases, as well as
from Radovich, that the Supreme Court intended to exempt the business
of baseball, not any particular facet of that business, from the federal antitrust laws.
Id. at 541 (trying to dispel notion that antitrust exemption only applies to reserve
system); see also Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1189 (11th Cir.
2003) (holding that decisions to contract teams falls squarely within "business of
baseball" and is protected under antitrust exemption); Gary Roberts, On the Scope
and Effect of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 4 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 321, 325 (1994)
(arguing that baseball's antitrust exemption extends to structuring of professional
baseball and production of baseball entertainment, but not to contracts between
professional baseball entities and third parties); Ross, supra note 54, at 205 (finding that Flood set baseball's antitrust exemption to encompass baseball's "unique
characteristics and needs").
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (eliminating antitrust exemption for issues concerning major league baseball players and reserve clause). Additionally, through
the Flood Act, Congress instructs courts not to "rely on the enactment" to grant
standing for lawsuits against MLB on other antitrust grounds. See id. § 26(b) (explaining enactment); see also Gillerman, supra note 47, at 570 (noting that Congress's silence on exemption's relationship to other antitrust issues suggests that
"the exemption encompasses other forms of concerted action").
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (highlighting narrow category of exempted issues); see also Gillerman, supra note 47, at 570 (stating that what remains subject to
antitrust exemption is widely open to judicial interpretation).
58. See Nathanial Grow, Defining the Business of "Baseball":A ProposedFramework
for Determiningthe Scope of ProfessionalBaseball's Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAvis L.
REv 557, 562 (2010) (discussing variance of opinion amongst courts and scholars
regarding scope of baseball's antitrust exemption); Peter M. Macaluso, Bang the
Gavel Slowly: A Callfor JudicialActivism Following the Curt Rlood Act, 9 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 463, 471 (2000) (expressing how lack of unity amongst precedent makes it
unlikely to determine how Supreme Court would rule on antitrust exemption);
Tomlinson, supra note 55, at 309 (describing extremes of interpretation and how
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An Exempted Commissioner: All Roads Lead to Despotism

With the luxury of an exemption from antitrust laws since
1922, MLB commissioners have enjoyed unbridled reign over an
industry and have wielded absolute power in legislating, executing,
and adjudicating the private laws of baseball.59 Bud Selig entered
the commissioner's office in 1992, a little over a decade after being
sued for orchestrating owner collusion in the 1980s.60 His family
continued to own the Milwaukee Brewers baseball team even while
he started his official tenure as the commissioner of MLB in 1998.61
Finding no problem or conflict of interest with this situation, Selig
continued the unethical practices in the commissioner's office that
had made him notorious as an owner. 6 2
As Commissioner, Bud Selig unilaterally eliminated the Presidents of the American and National Leagues while consolidating all
some interpret exemption to encompass "business of baseball," while others interpret it as limited to reserve clause or to longer exist).
59. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 163 (establishing office of commissioner as
law unto himself starting with Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis); see
Parlow, supra note 40, at 184 (describing how first commissioner would accept position only if he received unbridled reign over game); see also Shayna M. Sigman,
The jurisprudence ofJudge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 15 MARQ. SPORTs L. REv. 277,
304 (2005) (discussing how first commissioner demanded commissioner receive
unchecked investigative and judicial powers).
60. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 176 (describing how commissioner's office
witnessed worst scandals and most unethical practices game had ever seen under
Bud Selig's regime). Prior to Selig entering the commissioner's office, baseball
owners, including Selig, had settled with the players for their part in the owner
collusion that had kept player salaries at abnormally low levels in the 1980s. See id.
(noting pattern of low salaries); see also Haupert, supra note 39 (detailing owner
collusion of 1980s where owners agreed not to bid on one another's free agents to
keep player salaries low). As commissioner, Bud Selig pawned off the $280 million
settlement on expansion teams, charging unprecedented prices of $490 million to
join MLB for the four new baseball cities: Tampa Bay, Phoenix, Denver, and
Miami. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 177 (arguing that "new owners . . . paid for
old owners' sins").
61. See John Helyar & Scott Soshnick, Selig Bends Rules to Fit in Effort to Oust
McCourt from Dodgers, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-10-24/selig-bends-rules-to-fit-as-baseball-attempts-to-oust-mccourt-fromdodgers.html (indicating that Selig's daughter took control of Milwaukee Brewers
when Selig was confirmed as commissioner in 1998).
62. See Lamme, supra note ?9, at 177-81 (explaining how Selig used contraction to help pay off settlement damages); Sandomir, supra note 15 (arguing that
Selig has widened commissioner's "best interest" powers since becoming commissioner). Reports also indicate that Selig, who helped implement a rule requiring
teams to maintain a ratio of at least 60% equity and 40% debt, suspended enforcement of the rule as commissioner from 1994-1998 when the Milwaukee Brewers
were conveniently in violation of the rule. See Helyar & Soshnick, supra note 61, at
2 (noting that Brewers were in violation of rule for seven of ten years they were
audited, but never had rule enforced against them by Selig).
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power in the Office of the Commissioner.63 Additionally, he increased the commissioner's salary from $650,000 to an astronomical $18.4 million today. 64 Furthermore, Selig has overseen and
permitted a myriad of anticompetitive actions that have occurred
under his watch. 65 In 2002, he threatened to contract MLB; a move
that would have eliminated the Minnesota Twins and the Montreal
Expos had it not been for public outcry.66 In 2005, Selig approved
a monopolistic deal granting Baltimore Orioles owner, Peter
Angelos, a ninety percent share of the Washington Nationals' television rights.67 And although Bud Selig refused to help the Dodgers
with a new television contract, he bailed out New York Mets owner
Fred Wilpon when he was sued in March of 2011 by Bernie Madoff
victims.68 Apparently, criminal fraud was not as egregious of a con63. See Commissioners of Major League Baseball, American League Presidents and
National League Presidents, BASEBALL ALMANAC (2011), http://www.baseball-almanac.com/recbooks/officials.shtml (indicating that Selig discontinued president
positions for both leagues to centralize power in one commissioner to "unify the
leagues."); Lamme, supra note 29, at 180 (recounting Selig's unilateral decision to
eliminate American and National League presidents and to consolidate power in
commissioner's office).
64. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 180 (noting that Selig's starting salary was
$650,000); Cork Gaines, Bud Selig Makes Almost Twice as Much as Roger Goodell, Bus.
INSIDER (July 26, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-07-26/sports/
30008559_1_bud-selig-gary-bettman-nhl-commissioner (revealing astronomical nature of Selig's salary in comparison to commissioners in other sports leagues).
65. For a discussion of Bud Selig's anticompetitive practices, see Lamme,
supranote 29, at 176-81 (arguing that Selig's regime is corrupt with retribution and
despotism).
66. See Twins, Expos Look to Future Without Contraction, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Aug. 30, 2002, 7:56 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2002/
08/30/contractionjlabor..ap/ (commenting on new labor agreement and how it
prevents Selig from eliminating any teams from MLB); David Schoenfield, Still 30
Teams: Contraction Timeline, ESPN (Feb. 5, 2002), http://static.espn.go.com/mlb/
s/2002/0205/1323230.html (describing Bud Selig's efforts for contraction of
MLB, and subsequent public outcry against his actions).
67. See Bruce Fein, Baseball's PrivilegedAntitrust Exemption, DCBAR (Oct. 2005),
http://www.dcbar.org/for_1awyers/resources/publications/washington-lawyer/
october_2005/stand.cfm (detailing Angelos's efforts to prevent Washington from
getting team, and his subsequent pact with Selig so Nationals could play in Washington market). Peter Angelos eventually lost the battle against the arrival of a
new team, but won the war by obtaining monopolistic control from Selig over the
Washington Nationals television rights with a 90 - 10% ownership split in his favor.
See id. (explaining Nationals' television rights).
68. See Brian Ross, Mets Money Mishap May Make MLB a Monopoly After All, HurFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brianross/mets-money-mishap-revives-b-828745.html (discrediting Selig's discretionary
allotment of loan money to Mets owner who was allegedly involved in Madoff
ponzi scheme); Bud Selig: Lord of the Realm, IT'S ALL ABOUT THE MONEY (Feb. 26,
2011), http://itsaboutthemoney.net/archives/2011 /02/26/bud-selig-lord-of-therealm/ (comparing McCourt and Mets situation and pointing out how Selig is
helping one owner who was possibility involved in one of history's biggest criminal
frauds, while attempting to oust McCourt from MLB for financial mismanage-
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cern as the financial mismanagement in McCourt's case. 6 9 Additionally, Bud Selig also helped Tom Hicks, owner of the Texas
Rangers, without threatening to kick him out of MLB. 70 It was with
this broad, sweeping, and arbitrary power that Bud Selig acted in
the "best interests of baseball" by taking over the day-to-day operations of the Los Angeles Dodgers, vetoing a television deal which
forced them into bankruptcy, and demanding that MLB be permitted to sell the team. 7 '
The strong-armed tactics of Commissioner Bud Selig has successfully forced McCourt into a settlement agreement that will expel him from the league and from his ownership of the Dodgers.7 2
Even if McCourt decided not to settle, but instead chose to challenge Selig's attempts to run him out of MLB, baseball's antitrust
exemption probably would have stood between him and a successful antitrust lawsuit against Selig and the league. 73 If there was ever
a better time, however, for the judiciary to overturn an archaic and
ment). "[T]his shows just how much arbitrary and capricious power the commissioner of baseball can exercise from time to time." Id.
69. See Ian O'Connor, Hey, Bud Selig: Take Our Mets, Please!, ESPN NEW YORK
(May 25, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/new-york/mlb/columns/
story?columnistconnor ian&id=6584339 (asserting that until Selig treats Wilpon in
similar manner to McCourt, then it looks like he's unjustly favoring his good
friend, Wilpon).
70. See Mike Ozanian, Frank McCourt is Right But Will Still Lose Dodgers to Bud
Selig, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2011/04/21/frank-mccourt-is-right-but-will-still-lose-dodgers-to-budselig/ (examining differences in Selig's treatment of Dodgers verses Rangers, noting that Selig never took over operations of Rangers or threatened to oust owner
from baseball).
71. See Weiss, supra note 4 (declaring that Bud Selig took over Dodgers in
what he viewed as "best interests" of baseball); Shaikan and Wharton, supra note 6
(detailing Bud Selig's rejection of McCourt's television deal with Fox Sports);
Shaikin, supra note 11 (discussing Bud Selig's efforts to remove McCourt from his
ownership of Dodgers and to run him out of MLB).
72. See Ozanian, supra note 70 (citing commissioner's broad "best interest"
clause as reason for likelihood that McCourt will lose Dodgers to Bud Selig and
MLB); Helyar & Soshnick, supra note 61 (noting vast power of Bud Selig and his
goal to remove McCourt from ownership of Los Angeles Dodgers); see also Mike
Ozanian, Selig Wantsfudge to Force Sale of Dodgers, FoRBEs (Sep. 24, 2011, 8:37 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2011/09/24/selig-wants-judge-toforce-sale-of-dodgers/ (describing Selig's request to bankruptcy judge asking for
order requiring McCourt to sell Dodgers). The protracted litigation from MLB's
efforts to dethrone McCourt has starved the Dodgers financially. SeeJackson, supra
note 19 (discussing reasons for McCourt's settlement with MLB).
73. See McCann, supra note 17 (recognizing strength of baseball's antitrust
exemption in areas not involving players or franchise relocation). "[T]here are at
least two issues that are likely presently included within the scope of baseball's
antitrust exemption, the minor league system and franchise relocation . . . ." See
Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 31, at 275 (asserting what is still included within
confines of baseball's antitrust exemption).
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outdated precedent, the time is now. 7 4 Baseball's antitrust exemption stands in McCourt's way, but if the exemption were judicially
overturned or congressionally abolished, then he could probably
bring a viable claim against MLB under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.7 5
C. The Sherman Antitrust Act: A Brief History
and its Requisite Elements
The Sherman Act has its roots in the Industrial Revolution
when robber barons like Rockefeller and Carnegie accumulated
massive fortunes and undercut competition by creating agreements
that would help enhance their wealth.76 The purpose behind the
Sherman Act rests in the fear the Federal Government had that a
small group of individuals would stifle competition through monopolies and cartelization. 7 7 Its philosophy centers on the premise
that free competition among business entities will produce the best
price levels. 78 Thus, to promote free competition and to protect
74. See Morgen A. Sullivan, "A Derelict in the Stream of the Law": OverrulingBaseball's Antitrust Exemption, 48 DuKE L.J. 1265, 1267 (1999) (advocating for court to
abolish baseball's antitrust exemption because of eroded foundation of "positive
inaction" doctrine, obsolete factual conditions, and scholarly criticism). The positive inaction doctrine advocated by courts in many cases dealing with baseball's
antitrust exemption is further weakened by the Court's action in overturning a
ninety-six year old antitrust precedent. See Ariana E. Gillies, Not With a Bang, but a
Whimper: Congress's Proposal to Overturn the Supreme Court's Leegin Decision with the
Discount PricingConsumer ProtectionAct of 2009, 18 VILL. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 645, 645
(2011) (noting Supreme Court's willingness to overturn a ninety-six year old precedent in antitrust law).
75. See McCann, supra note 17 (discussing possibilities of McCourt bringing
antitrust claim against MLB under Section 1 of Sherman Act); Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (citing antitrust claim).
76. See Gillies, supra note 74, at 651-52 (citing origins of Sherman Act); Antitrust: An Overview, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/antitrust (providing introduction to antitrust law under Sherman Act); T.J.
Stiles, Robber Barons or Captains of Industry ?, GILDER LEHRMAN INSTITUTE OF AMERIcAN HISTORY (June 2010), http://www.gilderlehrman.org/historynow/06_2010/
historian4.php (commenting on rise of regulation due to price fixing and monopolization activities of robber barons like Rockefeller and Carnegie).
77. SeeJoshua Hamilton, Congress in Relief The Economic Importance of Revoking
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1223, 1225 (1998) (describing purpose and goal behind passage of Sherman Act on July 2, 1890).
Economists believe that [monopolies and cartelization] injures both individuals and the public because [they] lead[ ] to anticompetitive practices
in an effort to obtain or maintain total control. Anticompetitive practices
then lead to price controls and diminished individual initiative. These
results in turn cause markets to stagnate and depress economic growth.
Antitrust: An Overview, supra note 76 (presenting reasons for Sherman Act's purpose of prohibiting monopolies and cartels in American economy).
78. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1225 (explaining basic premise of Sherman Act). See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26
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the American consumer, Congress passed the Sherman Act in July
1890.79
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states."8 0 Although it appears that any restraint on trade will be illegal, only unreasonable
restraints will violate the Sherman Act.8 1 When deciding what constitutes an unreasonable restraint, courts do not have to resort to
the plain meaning of the statute, but may freely interpret the Sherman Act in light of the economic concerns of the time.8 2 Broken
down into its component parts, a colorable section 1 claim requires
three elements: (1) the existence of a contract between two or
more separate entities; (2) an unreasonable restraint on trade; (3)
which affects interstate commerce.8 3 Anyone found to have violated the Sherman Act will face penalties requiring the individual to
pay plaintiffs "threefold the damages .. . sustained, and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 84
There are two tests a court may apply when deciding whether a
violation of the Sherman Act has occurred: the Per Se Test or the
(1940) (proposing that collusion among competitors may produce prices which
harm consumers)
79. See Gillies, supranote 74, at 652 (stating Congress's fear that small number
of individuals will accumulate massive wealth and create agreements that hurt
competition and stifle economic growth).

80. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
81. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1226 (explaining that restraint on trade
must be found unreasonable by court); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)
(recognizing that courts only prohibit "unreasonable" restraints on trade). Additionally, a plaintiff in a civil antitrust action "must demonstrate a causal connection
among the following: (1) injury suffered, (2) to business or property, by (3) the
violation of an antitrust law." SeeJosephJ. McMahon, Jr. &John P. Rossi, A History
and Analysis of Baseball's Three Antitrust Exemptions, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 213,
251 (1995) (quoting E. THOMAS SULUVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw,
POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 33 (3d ed. 1994)) (explaining necessity of connecting various elements for successful prima facie case).
82. See Gillies, supra note 74, at 652 (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)) (recognizing that legislative purpose behind Sherman Act was to keep it flexible and focused on restraint's impact on
competitive conditions). For a discussion of the substantial transformation this
flexible practice of interpretation has had on Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence, see id. at 653-54 (detailing how effect of common law has transformed Sherman Act from influence of Chicago school to modem day economics).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (citing section 1 elements); Gillerman, supra note
47, at 551-52 (quotingJack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club,
407 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005)) (providing requisite elements for successful
Sherman Act section 1 lawsuit).
84. Sherman Antitrust Act, at § 15 (2004).
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Rule of Reason Test.8 5 The Per Se Test is reserved for contracts,
agreements, and restraints that are "plainly anticompetitive" and
are "conclusively presumed illegal without further examination." 86
Conversely, the Rule of Reason test is used in situations "where the
economic impact of the challenged practice is not obvious."8 7
Under the Rule of Reason, a court will consider factors that include
"specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraints history, nature, and effect."88 The following analysis will utilize the
Rule of Reason Test because of the disagreement surrounding the
economic impact of the Sherman Act as applied to MLB. 89
1. Existence of a Contract Among Two or More Separate Entities
To establish a viable section 1 claim under the Sherman Act,

plaintiffs must first prove the existence of a contract among two or
more separate entities.9 0 The alleged "contract, combination . .. or
85. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 551-52 (noting two tests courts use to determine occurrences of antitrust violations); Joseph J. McMahon, Jr. & John P.
Rossi, A History and Analysis of Baseball's Three Antitrust Exemptions, 2 VILL. SPORTS &
EN. L.J. 213, 251 (1995) (referencing three requirements for prima facie antitrust
suit).
86. See Broad. Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (quoting N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)) (describing certain agreements
which have pernicious effects on competition and lack any redeeming value "are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal."). "Perse rules are
invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive
conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged
conduct." Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984)
(citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16, n.25 (1984))
(asserting what is needed for a per se violation of section 1 under Sherman Act).
87. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 552 (quoting Jack Russell Terrier Network, 407 F.3d 1027, 1033 (2005)). "[T]he Court considers 'whether the restraint
imposed .

.

. merely regulates and perhaps . . . promotes competition or whether

... it may suppress or even destroy competition.' If it is the latter, then the restraint will likely be found unreasonable." See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1226
(quoting Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)) (noting type of
restraint).

88. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). However, this is not an exhaustive list; a company's market power is also given significant consideration. See
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (examining market power and structure to assess combination's actual effect).
89. For a discussion of some of the disagreements over competitive economic
effects and the antitrust exemption in the context of franchise relocation, see
Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 31, at 275-83 (discussing disagreement that persists
over economic effects that may result from lifting exemption). For a discussion of
the economic disagreements over the exemption, see generally Hamilton, supra
note 77, at 1253-54.
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (citing elements to prove claim); see Am. Needle,
Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010) (citing section 1 of
Sherman Act and highlighting requirements for element one). The Court in Amer-
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conspiracy" must be concerted action which joins together separate
decision-makers. 9' In some cases, however, the court has recognized that collaboration is needed in order for a league like MLB to
operate effectively.9 2 Thus, it must be determined "whether the restraint of trade is outweighed by the benefit that the agreement
provides to consumers."9 3 Even if there is a history of concerted
activity, that does not immunize anticompetitive conduct from section 1 scrutiny under the Sherman Act. 94 The Court in American
Needle helped illustrate what needs to be considered by way of an
analogy:
[A] nut and a bolt can only operate together, but an
agreement between nut and bolt manufacturers is still subject to [section] 1 analysis. Nor does it mean that once a
group of firms agree to produce a joint product, cooperation amongst those firms must be treated as independent
conduct. The mere fact that the teams operate jointly in
some sense does not mean that they are immune.9 5
Thus, on its face, American Needle broadly ruled out "single entity" status for sports leagues.9 6 As one scholar noted when commenting on American Needle, "where a venture is controlled by
independent entities with potentially distinct interests, any agreement among them represents the joining together of potentially independent economic forces and, therefore, constitutes concerted
ican Needle held that NFL teams are not single entities for purposes of section 1
when it comes to marketing teams' individually owned intellectual property. See id.
(describing holding of American Needle).
91. See Am. Needle, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (stating further requirements for
single entity status).
92. See id. at 2216-17 (distinguishing collaborative restraints with anticompetitive effects harmful to consumers and collaborative restraints that are in consumer's best interest); Gillerman, supra note 47, at 559 (recognizing that MLB
clubs sometimes need to cooperate "on matters intimately affecting their economic interests").
93. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1227 (citing Broad. Music v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)) (asserting that collaboration is sometimes necessary
in order to offer goods to public).
94. American Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2214 (2010) (announcing there is no
blanket immunity under section 1 of Sherman Act).
95. See id. at 2214 (concluding that some collaboration, or history of collaboration does not provide immunity from section 1 scrutiny under Sherman Act).
96. See Meir Feder, Is There Life After Death ForSports League Immunity? American
Needle and Beyond, 18 ViLL. SPoRTs & ENr. L.J. 407, 420 (2011) (citing Am. Needle
v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010)) (asserting that American
Needle ruled out "single entity" defense not only for sports leagues, but other joint
ventures of substantial and independently managed and owned businesses).
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action subject to section 1."9 Another group of scholars, recognizing the impact of American Needle, argued that the Court and Congress are whittling down antitrust exemptions to a few select
functions and therefore, baseball may stand to lose its exemption
entirely.98
2.

UnreasonableRestraint on Trade

Once the court determines that a contract or agreement exists
amongst two or more separate entities, the court must then decide
whether the contract creates an unreasonable restraint on trade.99
An unreasonable restraint involves contracts or agreements that either "had, or [are] likely to have, an adverse effect on [interstate]
competition.10 0 Under the Rule of Reason, a court will evaluate
whether the challenged conduct "has an unlawful purpose or anticompetitive effect." 0 1
There has only been one instance of a MLB owner suing the
commissioner for unreasonably restraining trade.10 2 In that case,
97. Id. at 420 (describing what counts as concerted action under section 1
when a venture is controlled by independent entities with distinct interests).
98. See Mozes and Glicksman, supra note 31, at 283 (projecting what might
come for MLB in wake of American Needle striking down likelihood of success for
sports league using "single entity" defense).
99. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 560 (citing Standard Oil Co. of NewJersey
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911)) (stating that determination of unreasonable restraint is second inquiry under section 1 claim).
100. Gillerman, supra note 47, at 560.
101. McMahon and Rossi, supra note 81, at 251 (quoting E. THOMAS SULLIVAN
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 33, 80 (3d ed.
1994)). To determine whether challenged conduct has an unlawful purpose or
anticompetitive effect:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save
an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Id.; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (listing
relevant factors for determining anticompetitive behavior); see Gillies, supra note
74, at 654 (describing how initial burden is placed on plaintiff to prove activity
unreasonably restrains trade); see Gillerman, supra note 82, at 560 ("It is this requirement - that plaintiffs be able to demonstrate the actual, tangible anticompetitive effects of the restraint - wherein the first major obstacle in proving this claim
lies.").
102. See Bud Selig Says MLB Will Run Dodgers, ESPN LA (Apr. 21, 2011, 5:03
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/mlb/news/story?id=6397488 (detailing other attempt by MLB owner to sue commissioner).
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Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,10 3 Oakland Athletics owner Charles Finley
sued MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn for preventing Finley from
selling the contracts of star players to the Red Sox and Yankees.104
The Seventh Circuit held that Kuhn exercised his power appropriately in the "best interests" of baseball and did not arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably restrict trade. 0 5 No commissioner,
however, has ever taken the drastic step of restraining an owner
from the game by kicking him out of MLB for financial mismanagement. 10 6 An owner found in this situation may be able to prove an
unreasonable restraint on trade through a variety of arguments revealing the anticompetitive nature of the commissioner's actions.
a.

Ancillary Restraints

One way of proving anticompetitive behavior is through the
"ancillary restraints doctrine," which requires that rules be tailored
to complete league objectives.1 0 7 Under the ancillary restraints
doctrine, courts must evaluate (1) whether a challenged agreement
is ancillary to an efficiency-enhancing collaboration, and (2)
whether the restraints are reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiency benefits produced by collaboration. 0 8 It originated from
103. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
104. See id. at 531 (holding MLB Commissioner's decision to disapprove of
player trades under authority of "best interests" did not constitute unreasonable
restraint on trade in violation of section 1 of Sherman Act). When Commissioner
Kuhn voided the trades made by Finley, the Oakland owner said, "Kuhn 'sounds
more like a village idiot than a commissioner of baseball' and [he subsequently]
sued to have the deals go through, charging restraint of trade." See Bud Selig Says
MLB Will Run Dodgers, supra note 102 (detailing Finley's claim against commissioner); see McMahon & Rossi, supra note 85, at 253 (noting that Finley case may
indicate that "decisions made by the Commissioner regarding player trades under
the Commissioner's 'best interests of baseball' authority are exempt from antitrust
scrutiny.").
105. See Finley & Co., 569 F.2d 527, 531 (finding that commissioner has broad
authority to act in best interests of baseball, regardless of moral turpitude or
whether transaction or practice complies with MLB rules).
106. See Mead, supra note 2 (noting previous takeovers by MLB commissioners, but none have ever occurred for complete mismanagement). In the past, most
disputes have ended with owners walking away from the game because of the disincentive to challenge MLB's overarching and seemingly impenetrable antitrust exemption. See McCann, supra note 17 (commenting on rare instances where owners
challenge each other or MLB under antitrust laws).
107. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposalfor the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U.L. REv. 889, 930 (1999) (explaining that under ancillary restraints doctrine, restraints unrelated to league's efficiency objectives would be
deemed void).
108. See Stephen F. Ross and Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League
Sports, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 625, 640 (2002) (describing requisite elements for violation of section 1 under ancillary restraints doctrine).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss2/9

HeinOnline -- 19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 805 2012

22

Polonis: Stealing Home in Hollywood: Why the Takeover of the Los Angeles D

806

VILLANOVA SPORTS

& ENr. LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 19: p. 785

William Howard Taft's holding in United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. 0 9
The ancillary restraints doctrine was first applied to sports
leagues in NCAA v. Board of Regents.o1 0 In the NCAA case, the Court
held that the television plan in question did not produce any procompetitive effects because it reduced the volume of television
rights sold and did not reduce the price of televised games."' Only
restraints that bear a reasonable relationship to the league's efficiency objectives are ancillary, and thus subject to a balancing test
of their efficiency objectives against any potential anticompetitive
effects.11 2 Legitimate league objectives that are ancillary restraints
include competitive balance, fan interest, and scheduling efficiency."13 However, leagues are not allowed to enforce restraints,
even in these areas, if they can accomplish the same objectives
through less restrictive means. 11 4 Courts place the burden on
leagues to prove their efficiency objectives and membership rules
are ancillary, and therefore reasonable and not anti-competitive.1 15
109. 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (holding that naked restraints unrelated to joint
venture's procompetitive purpose should be void). A restraint of trade should
only be permissible when it is "ancillary to the main purpose of a contract reasonably adapted and limited to the necessary protection of a party in carrying out of
such a purpose." Id. at 283. See Ross and Szymanski, supra note 108, at 639-40
(citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899)) (marking
beginning of ancillary restraints application).
110. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). See Ross and Szymanski, supra note 108, at 640 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115-16 (1984)) (noting that court's decision to restrain output of televised games had adverse effects on price, output, and
responsiveness of output to consumer demand). The recent adoption and revival
of the ancillary restraints doctrine "leaves little doubt that the approach should be
used to analyze the membership rules of sports leagues." See Thomas A. Piraino,
The Antitrust Rationalefor the Expansion of ProfessionalSports Leagues, 57 OHIo ST. L.J.
1677, 1709 (1996) (advocating for adoption of ancillary restraints doctrine by federal courts to consider relationship between league's efficiency objectives and
membership requirements).
111. See NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 115 (noting uniqueness of college football and
how there's no need for product to compete against nonexistent competitors, especially when NCAA television plan reduces volume of television rights sold).
These types of restraints in closed leagues "[bear] [the] hallmarks of an unreasonable restraint on trade." See Piraino, supra note 107, at 940 (arguing that closed
league structure allows league to restrict number of franchises below efficient
level).
112. See Piraino, supra note 107, at 930-31 (noting this inquiry should be able
to confirm a restraint's net competitive effect without conducting complicated economic analysis).
113. See Piraino, supra note 110, at 1709 (providing a non-exhaustive list of
what qualifies as a legitimate league objective).
114. See id. (noting restrictions on league objectives).
115. See id. (advocating fairness of shifting burden to leagues because they are
in best position which membership rules are necessary to accomplish their efficiency objectives).
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Essential Facilities

Another way of proving anticompetitive behavior is through
the "essential facilities doctrine."' 16 Courts have characterized essential facilities as "any joint ventures which control a non-duplicable resource to which access is necessary in order to compete
effectively in a relevant market."' 17 The doctrine dates back to
1912 from the Supreme Court case, United States v. Terminal Railroad
Association." 8 This case concerned fourteen railroads owned by the
Terminal Railroad Association. 19 In Terminal Railroad,no competing railroad could access St. Louis from the east without first using
the Association's facilities.120 The Court held that the Association
must permit other railroads to use their facilities "upon such just
and reasonable terms as shall place such railroads upon a plane of
equality in respect of benefits and burdens with the [current owners]."121 A multitude of other Supreme Court cases followed Terminal Railroad's precedent. 22
As applied to sports leagues, the "essential facilities doctrine"
does not allow leagues like MLB to arbitrarily refuse to admit qualified applicants because the leagues control all means of entry into
116. See id. at 1689 (asserting that sports leagues are essential facilities).
117. Id. (quoting LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 131 (1977)).
"If a group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a common facility and if due to a natural advantage, custom, or restrictions of scale, it is
not feasible for excluded competitors to duplicate a facility, the competitors who
operate the facility must give access to the excluded competitors on reasonable,
non-discriminatory terms." LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST 131 (1977).
118. 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See Piraino, supra note 110, at 1690 (citing United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912)) (marking beginning of essential facilities doctrine).
119. See Terminal R.R Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 395-96. The Association controlled
the only means for railroads to access St. Louis from the east over two bridges
crossing the Mississippi River. See id. (laying out facts for why bridges constituted
"essential facilities").
120. See id. at 395-96 (explaining why none of twenty-four rail lines connecting to St. Louis could pass through city without first using Association's bridge).
121. Piraino, supra note 110, at 1690 (quoting Terminal RR, 224 U.S. 383,
411) (asserting that all other railroads must be permitted to use bridges and ferry).
122. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1945) (holding
that members of Associated Press cannot exclude competitors from membership
with news service); see also Radiant Burners v. People Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656, 658-60 (1961) (holding industry-wide standards-setting organization unreasonably restrained trade because discretionary seal of approval was required for
participation in relevant market); see also Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
344-45 (1963) (holding that denial of access to private wire system, section 1 violated because of inability to compete in over counter market for sale of securities).
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the relevant market.s2 3 The primary reasoning behind this logic is
the fact that sports are not interchangeable. 12 4 This lack of interchangeability imposes a duty of essential facility operators to deal
fairly with members or applicants, or to continue an already existing relationship.1 25 Some circuits use a four-part test when assessing an essential facilities claim that includes: (1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial
of the use of the facility to the competitor; and (4) the feasibility of
providing the facility. 126 Given these considerations, scholars argue
the burden should be placed on leagues like MLB "to demonstrate
a valid efficiency justification for any of their restrictions on
membership."127

123. See Piraino, supra note 110, at 1693 (describing application of "essential
facilities" doctrine to sports leagues and league membership); see also A. Michael
Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 46
(2003)) (noting criticism essential facilities doctrine has received, but how some
scholars still approve of its application).
124. Courts have recognized, from a consumer perspective, that sports are
not interchangeable with other sports or forms of entertainment. See NCAA, 468
U.S. 85, 111-12 (1984) (holding that college football broadcasts constituted a separate market because they are watched by a unique audience); see also Piraino, supra
note 110, at 1694 (noting that fans have not switched allegiance from their preferred sport to others because of increased ticket prices, strikes, or other economic
difficulties). Additionally, evidence suggests that consumers are not likely to consider competing baseball leagues comparable to MLB's American or National
Leagues. See also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposalfor the Antitrust Regulation of
ProfessionalSports, 79 B.U. L. REv. 889, 948 (1999) (describing how leagues cannot
reject qualified members or applicants to leagues because resources cannot be reasonably duplicated given sheer impossibility for prospective owners to form rival
leagues).
125. See Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential
FacilitiesDoctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. Sc. &
TECH. 481, 488 (2007) (asserting how access to essential facilities must be given on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms).
126. See Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 123, at 46 (citing MCI Commc'n
Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1097 (7th Cir. 1983)) (stating test used in some
jurisdictions for determining what constitutes essential facilities). Recent case law
suggests that the essential facilities doctrine has been limited to specific circumstances "where foreclosure of competition in the downstream market would occur
or where the refusal of the [essential facilities doctrine] would help the owner to
acquire or maintain a monopoly in that market." See Lim, supra note 125, at 489
(citing Froomkin & Mark Lemley, supra note 123, at 46) (declaring there must be
foreclosure in downstream market or monopolistic effect for use of essential facilities doctrine).
127. SeePiraino, supra note 110, at 1705 (recognizing that membership is sine
qua non for participation and therefore any restriction on membership must have
efficiency justifications).
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Affects Interstate Commerce

After finding that a contract or agreement has an unreasonable restraint on trade, a court must determine if this restraint affects interstate commerce.1 2 8 The issue of baseball and its effect on
interstate commerce was first discussed in Federal Baseball.12 9 In a
rare judicial aberration from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the
Supreme Court held that baseball did not have an effect on interstate commerce. 13 0 Some fifty years later in Flood v. Kuhn, the Supreme Court overturned this portion of FederalBaseballby explicitly
stating that "[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged
in interstate commerce." 13 1 Therefore, the Supreme Court eradicated any previous ambiguity with the issue of baseball and its effects on commerce. 13 2

III.

MCCOURT v. SELIG:

A BATTLE

OF LEGAL HEAVYWEIGHTS

In October 2011, it appeared that Frank McCourt would not
surrender his ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers, but on November 1, 2011, McCourt finally decided to settle with Selig and
MLB.133 Without the luxury of an antitrust exemption, however,
McCourt's settlement with MLB may have had an entirely different
outcome. 134 In fact, without this luxury, Bud Selig's arbitrary decision not to accept any new television deal allowing McCourt to
128. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 564 (indicating third and final prima
facie element needed for successful section 1 suit under Sherman Act).
129. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'1 League of Prof'I Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (finding that "personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce.")
130. See id. at 209 (holding that business of baseball did not have effect on
interstate commerce and was therefore not subject to federal antitrust regulation).
131. See Flood, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (reversing at least some of Federal
Baseball holding when concluding that baseball is engaged in interstate
commerce).
132. See Burns, supra note 55, at 496 (noting that Flood recognized baseball is
engaged in interstate commerce, but that Court refused to overrule entire exemption out of concern for its retroactive effect on years of precedent); see also Ross,
supra note 54, at 192 (asserting FederalBaseball conception of commerce was clearly
overruled even prior to Flood by post-New Deal Court).
133. See Shaikin, supra note 18 (detailing agreement McCourt made with MLB
on November 1, 2011 to sell Dodgers).
134. See Michael McCann, Dodgers Deal is a Victory for Selig, and a Warningfor
Other Teams, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 2, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/2011/writers/michael_mccann/11/02/dodgers.sale/index.html (noting
how settlement with MLB signifies major victory for inherent power of Commissioner's Office). The settlement with MLB reveals that Bud Selig has the power
and authority to take control of teams and force out owners he finds unacceptable.
See id. (arguing that settlement is warning to league that Bud Selig has power to
expel owners he dislikes).
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maintain ownership of the team would probably have been viewed
as an unreasonable restraint on trade.13 5
Although there is a strong case against McCourt for his financial mismanagement of the team and use of Dodger money to finance his lavish lifestyle, Bud Selig has revealed his totalitarian
tendencies and the extent of his unchecked power throughout the
entire legal debacle with McCourt.' 3 6 If Selig did force McCourt
out against his will, then it would be the first time a commissioner
has forced an owner to sell his team since 1912 when Philadelphia
Phillies' Horace Fogel was banished from MLB.1 37 Unlike Fogel,
however, McCourt may be successful in fighting back against the
commissioner.' 38 By filing an antitrust suit against Selig and MLB,
McCourt may be able to successfully challenge the veracity of
MLB's antitrust exemption and Bud Selig's totalitarian regime.' 3 9
A.

Bottom of the Ninth for McCourt - Sherman Up to Bat

1. Existence of a Contract
In his antitrust suit against MLB and Selig, Frank McCourt will
first need to prove the existence of a contract that represented con-

certed action of separate entities against his ownership of the
team. 140 Although no court has determined whether MLB falls
within the single entity scope, MLB's constitution contains provi135. See id. (illustrating Selig's perhaps unjust power over MLB). Baseball's
antitrust exemption as it currently stands may prevent McCourt from challenging
Bud Selig's authority as commissioner, but a lawsuit may be possible if MLB had to
adhere to antitrust laws. See id. (arguing that this is a foreboding incident for other
MLB owners because it indicates that Selig has power to remove owners at will and
is not afraid to use it).
136. See Bud Selig: Lord of the Realm, supra note 68 (reporting Selig's tendency
to selectively enforce his powers to help his friends, but not his foes like McCourt);
see also McCann, supra note 17 (discussing Selig's ever-expanding power in legal
battle verses McCourt).
137. See Bill Shaikin, Selig Weighs His Dodgers Options, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2010, at 1 (stating last time owner removed from MLB). The MLB Commissioner
who preceded Bud Selig, Fay Vincent, expressed his concerns about a forced sale
of the Dodgers by Selig when saying, "[n] obody will want to buy into baseball if the
commissioner can get upset and move to take away a franchise." Id. See Lalli, Horace Fogel: The Strangest Owner in Phillies History, PHILLY SPORTs HISToRY (July 6,
2011), http://phillysportshistory.com/2011/07/06/horace-fogel-the-strangestowner-in-phillies-history/ (discussing MLB's ousting of Fogel for his numerous accusations against league).
138. See McCann, supra note 17 (indicating McCourt may have legal options,
including antitrust claims, against Selig and MLB).
139. See Calcaterra, supra note 16 (stating that Selig's takeover of Dodgers
could imperil baseball's antitrust exemption).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (declaring contracts that restrain trade or commerce among states illegal); see also Am. Needle v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct.
2201, 2212 (2010) (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
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sions similar to those relied upon by the Supreme Court when rejecting the NFL's single entity defense.1 4 1 Therefore, courts are
likely to interpret MLB clubs as independent organizations operating in a unified league for the purposes of the first element under
section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 4 2
McCourt will need to prove that these independent organizations, specifically the twenty-nine other MLB owners, conspired
with Bud Selig to terminate his ownership interest in MLB. 14 3
Many owners expressed their private concerns and frustrations to
Bud Selig, worried about the devaluation of their franchises because of McCourt's financial and operational ineptness.1 4 4 Enough
owners reportedly shared Selig's "deep concerns" for the financial
state of the Dodgers to encourage Selig to take over the day-to-day
operations of the team in April 2011.145 Undoubtedly, the drama
that has ensued since - allegedly undervalued television deals,
bankruptcy, ongoing divorce proceedings, and numerous public
criticisms of the league - has inspired at least some owners to back
Selig in his expulsion of Frank McCourt from MLB.14 6 In fact, one
U.S. 752, 769 (1984)) (requiring that concerted action be joining together of separate economic decisionmakers).
141. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 558 (citing L.A. Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (1984)) (advocating that similarities between
MLB and NFL allow for conclusion that like NFL, MLB should not be considered
single entity). While MLB clubs cooperate on matters intimately affecting their
economic interests, they are constantly competing against one another for broadcast revenue, free agent players, ticket sales, and merchandise. See Feder, supra
note 96, at 420 (arguing that American Needle ruled out single entity defense for
sports leagues).
142. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 559 (citing Major League Const. art. I, II,
§ 1) (asserting that MLB Constitution should be analyzed in same light as NFL's
Constitution and therefore should not afford MLB single entity status under section 1 of Sherman Act); see Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 31, at 283 (arguing
single entity defense likely to be unsuccessful in wake of American Needle).
143. See Feder, supra note 96, at 420 (discussing concerted action under section 1 and how independent entities must be acting together).
144. See Brown, supra note 6 (noting that Selig is not acting alone and has
support of much of baseball). In recent court filings, Selig and MLB argued that
McCourt's attempts to sell television rights "is not in the best interest of the Debtors, Major League Baseball, or the 29 other MLB Clubs." See Maury Brown, In Bold
Move, MLB Files to Force FrankMcCourt to Sell Dodgers,Biz OF BASEBALL (Sep.2 4 , 2011,
10:16 AM), http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=5435:in-bold-move-mlb-files-to-force-frank-mccourt-to-sell-dodgers&catid=
70:mlb-club-sales&Itemid=157 (acknowledging concerted action in attempts to
force sale of Dodgers).
145. See Brown, supranote 6 (suggesting Selig had support of other team owners to take over Dodgers and remove McCourt from running day-to-day operations
of team).
146. See Ozanian, supra note 70 (describing Selig's request for sale of Dodgers
due to McCourt's extracting too much equity from Dodgers and bringing unnecessary drama to sport). It is likely that other owners will support Selig out of con-
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team executive stated "McCourt should know that Selig has the support of much of baseball, and that Selig probably won't stop until
he's forced McCourt to sell." 1 4 7 Furthermore, MLB owners know
they only stand to benefit from the Dodgers' sale as they lick their
lips at the thought of splitting $2.15 billion in revenue sharing. 14 8
Therefore, with evidence of a "contract, combination ...

or con-

spiracy" and concerted action of separate decision-makers, Frank
McCourt can probably meet the first element for a section 1 claim
under the Sherman Act. 1 4 9
2.

UnreasonableRestraint

The hardest element for McCourt to prove is that the agreement and conspiracy to remove him from MLB constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade.1 5 0 McCourt's golden tickets for
proving that an unreasonable restraint occurred are the "ancillary
restraints" and "essential facilities" doctrines. 15 1 If Selig chose to
expel McCourt from MLB against his will, then McCourt could argue: (1) Selig is in violation of the ancillary restraints doctrine because McCourt is in compliance with MLB rules, and therefore any
membership rules would not be reasonably tailored to league objectives, and (2) that MLB is an essential facility, and therefore cannot
restrain McCourt from participating, especially considering his
compliance with MLB rules. 1 5 2 Given these two arguments, Bud Secerns for franchise devaluation. See Brown, supra note 6 (considering Selig's
argument that McCourt's attempts to auction off television rights are not in "best
interests of baseball").
147. Brown, supra note 6 (noting Selig's vendetta against McCourt and his
persistence to oust McCourt from ownership of Dodgers).
148. See Steve Dilbeck, Dodgers' Frank McCourt: MLB Owners' New Inspiration,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dodgers/
(recognizing
2012/02/dodgers-frank-mccourt-mlb-owners-new-inspiration.html
how trickle-down effect of revenue sharing in MLB will make every owner richer
from Dodgers' sale); see also Futterman, supra note 26 (noting high sale price of
Dodgers' deal with MagicJohnson's ownership group).
149. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (stating contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade are per se illegal under Act).
150. See id. (outlining elements); see also Gillerman, supra note 47, at 560 (defining "unreasonable restraints"). "Unreasonable restraints are those agreements
and combinations that either 'had, or [are] likely to have, an adverse effect on
[interstate] competition." Id.
151. See Piraino, supra note 107, at 930 (arguing that ancillary restraints must
be related to league's efficiency objectives); see also Piraino, supra note 110, at 1689
(explaining why sports leagues fall under essential facilities doctrine).
152. For a discussion of what constitutes a violation of the ancillary restraint
doctrine, see Ross & Szymanski, supra note 108, at 640 (stating elements for viable
challenge to ancillary restraints doctrine). For a discussion of what constitutes a
violation of the essential facilities doctrine see Piraino, supra note 110, at 1709
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lig is probably imposing an unreasonable restraint on McCourt if
he forces him out of baseball.1 53
a.

Ancillary Restraints: MLB's Poorly Tailored Membership
Rules

Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, MLB membership rules
will first need to be evaluated to determine if they are overly broad
and not tailored to completing league objectives.154 The membership rules in question here are financial requirements that Bud Selig and MLB charge McCourt with failing to meet.'5 5 MLB's
allegation that McCourt failed to meet these requirements led to
Selig's takeover of the Dodgers in April 2011.156
The only financial requirement that teams must follow is the
debt limit rule, requiring franchises not to have debt exceed ten
times their operating income.1 5 7 Prior to filing for bankruptcy protection and receiving a loan from MLB, McCourt received two separate loans from Fox, and he also leveraged assets to finance the
purchase and operation of the Dodgers.1 5 8 Not only did Selig and
the other owners know about the loans McCourt used to purchase
the team, they welcomed him and his unstable financial situation
into the league with open arms.15 9 Nevertheless, McCourt does not
appear to have broken MLB's financial requirement because he
maintained $33 million of operating income and had less than
(describing what plaintiff needs to prove for viable claim under essential facilities
doctrine).
153. Both of these restraints may be proven to have an adverse or anticompetitive effect on interstate competition, and therefore may be deemed to be unreasonable. See McMahon & Rossi, supra note 81, at 251 (stating that "unlawful
purpose or anticompetitive effect[s]" are necessary for proving unreasonable
restraints).
154. See Piraino, supranote 110, at 1707 (asserting that restraints unrelated to
league's efficiency objectives are deemed to be void).
155. See Bill Shaikin, Frank McCourt Goes on a Fishing Expedition, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/26/sports/la-sp-0927-mlbdodgers-20110927 (reporting that Selig charges McCourt with using Dodgers as his
own personal "cash cow"). MLB claims it has grounds to kick McCourt out of the
league because "[a] Club owner must be well-capitalized and cannot use the team
as a personal 'cash cow.'" Id.
156. See PREss RELEASE, supra note 4 (declaring takeover of Dodgers due to
"deep concerns regarding the finances and operations of the Dodgers . . .").
157. See Ozanian, supranote 70 (describing how debt cannot exceed ten times
operating income, which includes earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization).
158. See id. (noting multiple loans McCourt took out to purchase and finance
Dodgers).
159. See Shaikin, supra note 155 (stating that MLB and other owners knew of
loans from Fox and Bank of America, yet still approved his purchase of Dodgers).
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$300 million in debt.1 60 While MLB undoubtedly has a legitimate
efficiency objective to minimize franchise debt, if McCourt is in
compliance with financial rules, then it does not seem equitable for
MLB to expand the scope of the rule solely on his account.' 6 1 Subjective and arbitrary enforcement of this membership rule is overly
broad, unpredictable, and not tailored to the league's efficiency objective for limiting franchise debt.'6 2
Even if McCourt is in violation of the debt limit rule, he is not
alone.16 3 At least nine teams in MLB, which may include the Dodgers, are in violation of MLB's debt limit rule.16 4 Thus, it may be
difficult for Bud Selig to enforce the membership rule that owners
give the commissioner the power to act in the "best interests of
baseball" to limit debt, enhance profitability, and maintain a competitive balance. 165 If Selig attempts to oust McCourt from the

league for spending team finances on personal matters, such as his
divorce settlement, then McCourt could reveal Selig's selective en-

forcement of the "best interests" clause.16 6
160. See Ozanian, supra note 70 (noting that remaining debt, primarily on
stadium and other real estate, does not exceed ten times operating income and
therefore does not violate MLB's debt limit rule); see also #3 Los Angeles Dodgers,
FORBES (2011), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/33/baseball-valuations-11_LosAngeles-Dodgers.338671.html (indicating debt/value percentage and amount of
revenue).
161. See id. (illustrating that McCourt is in compliance with MLB financial
guidelines); see also Piraino, supra note 107, at 930-31 (asserting that restraints on
membership must be tailored and accomplished through least restrictive means
possible).
162. See Piraino, supra note 107, at 930-31 (noting how restrictions must be
narrowly tailored).
163. See Bill Shaikin, Debt Is Not So Unique in MLB Nine of 30 Teams Are Said to
Be Over Limit, but McCourts' Use of Funds Makes Dodger's Situation Complicated, L.A.
TIMEs, June 3, 2011, at 1 (noting debt troubles for nine MLB teams).
164. See id. (including successful teams such as Philadelphia Phillies, Detroit
Tigers, and Texas Rangers).
165. See Ozanian, supra note 70 (predicting that Selig could use "best interests" clause to say that McCourt violated his fiduciary duty as owner of Dodgers).
166. See McCann, supra note 17 (noting other owners have many personal and
professional failings, but none have been taken over or ousted from ownership).
McCourt's goal here is not to slander other owners, but to give perspective to the
problem by characterizing his financial and personal situation as far from extreme.
See id. (identifying McCourt's motives). See also Eric Morath, Dodgers: Selig Targets
LA. Team as Fans Die Elsewhere, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2011/07/ 18/dodgers-selig-targets--a-team-as-fans-dieelsewhere/ (discussing discriminatory treatment of Dodgers while teams with arguably worse problems receive preferential treatment from Selig). One fan died in
2009 at the home of the Los Angeles Angels after getting attacked in the bleachers,
yet Selig did not take over the Angels. See id. (noting Angels' troubles in 2009).
Additionally, three men faced murder charges in connection with the beating
death of a man outside the Philadelphia Phillies' ballpark in 2009, but Selig did
not take over the Phillies. See id. (discussing Phillies' incident in 2009). However,
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One example of Selig's selective enforcement is Florida Marlins owner, Jeffrey Loria. 16 7 Loria reportedly took $198 million
from revenue sharing and placed some of the money into a company owned by himself and the club president.1 6 Perhaps the most
glowing example, however, of selective enforcement is Selig's treatment of the New York Mets owner, Fred Wilpon, who was potentially involved in the biggest Ponzi scheme in world history. 6 9 The
Mets are in violation of the league's debt rule, but Wilpon's friendship with Selig has helped prevent the commissioner from seizing
control of his franchise.17 0 In fact, Selig approved a $40 million
loan from Bank of America to Wilpon on top of the $25 million
loan Wilpon still owes to MLB.171 Selig made this loan with knowledge that $303 million is at stake in the lawsuit against Wilpon,
where Irving Picard, the trustee in the case, is seeking to prove that
the Mets owner was "willfully blind to Madoffs scheme while investing with him."17 2 The Mets must pay $83 million to Picard regardless of the result in the case because of the fictitious profits
when Bryan Stow, a San Francisco Giants fan, was beaten in the Dodgers parking
lot in 2011 and survived, Selig cited this as a primary reason for taking control of
the team. See id. (contrasting Selig's reaction to Dodgers' incident with his reaction to incidents at other ballparks).
167. See Jeff Passan, Marlins Exes Funneled Cash to Themselves, YAHoo! SPORTS
(Aug. 27, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-marlinsfinancials08
2810 (explaining how Marlins executives set up corporation to funnel team revenue to themselves).
168. See id. (detailing Loria's personal business transactions with MLB
money); see also Bill Shaikin, supra note 155 (reporting how Loria allegedly took
same amount of funds from revenue sharing for personal use that McCourt is accused of taking from Dodgers).
169. See Bud Selig: Lord of the Realm, supra note 68 (explaining how Wilpon was
engaged in one of biggest criminal frauds in American history, yet Selig allowed
him to maintain ownership). Aside from the $550 million the Mets lost when
Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme unraveled in 2009, Wilpon faces a possible trial in
2012 over claims by the trustees of Madoff's victims that Wilpon turned a blind eye
to signs that Madoff was up to no good. See Richard Sandomir, For Mets, Vast Debt
and Not a Lot of Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2011, at 6 (describing allegations against
Wilpon by trustees of Madoff victims).
170. See O'Connor, supra note 69 (reporting that Selig is favoring his good
friend Wilpon over McCourt, even though they are in similar situations).
171. See Sandomir, supra note 169 (noting preferential treatment Wilpon receives from Selig as opposed to Selig's treatment of McCourt under same private
laws of MLB). The Mets are drowning in debt with a $450 million loan for their
broadcasting network, SNY, and bonds payments for Citi Field that rose from $19
million to $43.7 million this past year. See id. As the article author reported, "That
is a lot of borrowing for a team that lost $70 million last season and had faltering
attendance." Id.
172. See Anthony DiComo, Wilpon, Katz Must Go to Trial in Madoff Case, MLB
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/articlejspymd=20120305&content id
=27017478&vkey=newsmlb&c_id=mlb (stating claim and damages sought against
Mets owner in Madoff case).
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reported by Wilpon and his ownership partner, Saul Katz. 173 Furthermore, another example of Selig's selective enforcement is his
handling of the Texas Rangers who were in violation of the debt
limit rule dating back to 2008, but were not taken over by MLB.17 4
Thus, Bud Selig's argument that McCourt is not acting in the "best
interest of baseball" blatantly reveals the arbitrary and discretionary
nature of this membership rule.1 75
The arbitrary and vast powers of the Commissioner's Office
under Bud Selig are overly broad and not reasonably necessary to
achieve the efficiency benefits gained from collaboration with
MLB.1 7 6 Without uniform application of membership rules like the
debt limit rule or the "best interests"' clause, members of the
league may be unjustly expelled, and therefore unreasonably restrained from participating.1 7 7 The stated efficiency benefits of
vesting the Commissioner with this authority is for him to provide a
centralized authority to protect the integrity and best interests of
the league.17 8 However, this broad, sweeping, and arbitrary power
is unreasonably restrictive when it is used to take over and expel
some owners with financial problems, but not others.17 9 This membership rule most likely violates the ancillary restraints doctrine be173. See id. (recognizing large sum of required payment to trustee aside from
potential damages in lawsuit).
174. See Ozanian, supranote 70 (noting that Rangers had negative operating
income in 2008, but Selig and MLB did not take over team).
175. See Sandomir, supra note 15 (describing ever-expanding scope of best
interests clause under Selig's reign).
176. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 108, at 640 (asserting requirements for
ancillary restraints). For a prime example of Selig's vast and arbitrary powers, see
e.g. Bud Selig: Lord of the Realm, supra note 68 (describing Selig's arbitrary treatment
of Mets and Dodgers' cases).
177. See Piraino, supra note 107, at 930 (requiring that rules must be tailored
to complete league objectives). This may create an anticompetitive effect of lowering franchise values, especially if owners fear they may be ousted when falling into
financial difficulties. See id. at 930-31 (noting that inquiry of restraint's net competitive effect can be conducted without complicated economic analysis).
178. SeeJason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator,Please: Commissioner "Best Interests"
DisciplinaryAuthority in Professional Sports, 67 FoRDwsu L. REv 1645, 1648 (1999)
(stating efficiencyjustifications for vesting all power in one commissioner); see also,
Sigman, supra note 59, at 304 (discussing how first commissioner demanded broad
and vast powers for commissioner's office).
179. This membership rule, the "best interests" clause, is overly broad, and
therefore not ancillary to the league objective of an efficient and centralized governing authority to protect the integrity and best interests of the game. See Pollack,
supra note 178, at 1648 (asserting central reason for having commissioner is to
protect integrity and best interests of league). It is arguable that it is not in the
"best interests" of sports leagues for so many teams to be in debt, yet only one team
is penalized for it. See Shaikin, supra note 163 (noting nine teams are in violation
of debt limit rule).
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cause it is not tailored to league objectives, given its discretionary
enforcement. 8 0 Therefore, if Bud Selig prevents McCourt from
participating as an owner in MLB, he is probably unreasonably restraining trade. 18'
b.

Essential Facilities: MLB's Qualifications

Despite an argument that McCourt violated certain provisions
in the Baseball Agreement and the MLB Constitution, McCourt can
argue that preventing him from maintaining ownership of the
Dodgers is an unreasonable restraint on trade because MLB is an
"essential facility."1 8 2 MLB qualifies as an essential facility because
the league is a non-duplicable resource. 83 Thus, assuming McCourt is in compliance with MLB membership rules, Selig cannot
exclude him from participating in the league because the league is
the only means for accessing the relevant market.184 No comparable league has survived in competition with MLB for more than a
few years since the Federal League in 1915.185 Moreover, McCourt
cannot be forced to invest in another sports franchise because
sports are not interchangeable. 18 6 Each sport has its own unique
and distinctive fan base.' 8 7
Absent a valid efficiency justification for this membership restriction, McCourt will likely be granted access to the league given
180. See Piraino, supranote 110, at 1709 (claiming that any restraints not narrowly tailored to league objectives will be void).
181. The burden will be on Bud Selig and MLB to prove that the "best interests" clause and the debt limit membership rules are not unreasonable restraints
on trade. See id. at 1709 (indicating burden shifts to leagues to prove membership
rules are tailored to efficiency objectives).
182. See id, at 1689 (arguing that sports leagues should be classified as essential facilities).
183. See id, at 1692-93 (stating how MLB cannot arbitrarily refuse to admit
qualified applicants because it controls all means of entry to relevant market).
184. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 131
(1977) (arguing that when competitor controls all means for entry to relevant market, that competitor must give access to excluded competitors on reasonable, nondiscretionary terms)
185. See American and National League Encyclopedia, BASEBALL-REFERENCE
(2011), http://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/ (noting that last defunct
league was Federal League in 1915).
186. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111-12 (1984) (finding that
college football is watched by unique audience, so sport cannot be interchangeable with others); see also Piraino, supranote 110, at 1694 (noting that fans will not
switch allegiance between sports even in face of increased ticket prices).
187. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 111-12 (recognizing targeted audiences for marketing purposes in college football).
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the aforementioned considerations.18 8 MLB and Bud Selig might
be able to argue, however, that the business of baseball will benefit
from restricting McCourt from participating in the league.1 89 In
response, McCourt can argue that although attendance may have
dropped in the past season, the Dodgers still maintained the 12th
highest payroll and an overall winning record under his ownership.1 90 Additionally, in his first years as an owner, MLB commended McCourt for cutting the inefficiencies of the Dodger's
business model used by the previous Fox ownership group.1 9 1
Therefore, with an opportunity to reorganize, it is reasonable to
believe McCourt would be capable of returning the Dodgers to
their successful and profitable past.1 92 While he had numerous financial transgressions, this is not a valid efficiency justification
when considering the widespread financial difficulties across the
league. 9 3 Penalizing McCourt and not others would be an arbitrary refusal for entry to an otherwise qualified applicant, which is a
188. See Piraino, supra note 110, at 1705 (asserting necessary connection between membership and participation that requires restraints to be tailored to
league's efficiency justifications).
189. See Shaikin, supra note 155 (stating that Selig wants "well-capitalized"
owner in exchange for McCourt). Under McCourt, the past season saw a drop in
attendance, finishing the season with 18% decrease. See Evan Brunell, MLB Says
McCourt 'Looted' $190M From Dodgers, CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 25, 2011, 11:58 AM),
http://eye-on-baseball.blogs.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/22297882/
32937221 (discussing McCourt's financial troubles and how Dodgers have been
losing money).
190. See Dodgers Total Payroll Ranks 12th in MLB, CBS Los ANGELEs (Apr. 4,
2011, 4:15 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/04/04/dodgers-total-payroll-ranks-12th-in-mlb/ (noting that Dodger payroll for 2011 topped $104 million);
see also Gene Maddaus, Frank McCourtFact Check: Dodgers' Record Was Better UnderFox
Ownership, L.A. WEEKLY BLOGS (May 4, 2011, 11:36 AM), http://blogs.laweekly.
com/informer/2011/05/mccourt factcheck dodgers-rec.php (recognizing McCourt's winning record with four playoff appearances in six years). However, McCourt only has a .523 winning percentage whereas Fox, the previous owner, had a
slightly better winning percentage at .524. See id. (distinguishing winning
percentages).
191. See Ramona Shelburne, Dodgers Situation a Comedy, Drama,ESPN (Jan. 19,
2012, 10:26 PM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/mlb/story/_/id/7475039/losangeles-dodgers-situation-comedy-drama (noting that "McCourt initially did a
good job of getting the Dodgers' financial house in order after Fox ran the team at
a substantial loss.").
192. See Frank H. McCourt,Jr. Owner and Chairman,MLB.coM (2011), http://
(noting McCourt's acmlb.mlb.com/la/community/executives/fmccourt.html
complishments as owner of Dodgers). Under his reign the Dodgers reached backto-back National League Championship Series ("NLCS") for the first time in thirtyone years (1977-78), and prior to his purchase of the team the Dodgers had not
reached the NLCS or won a postseason game in fifteen years. See id. (listing McCourt's accomplishments).
193. See Shaikin, supra note 163 (examining widespread debt problems in
MLB, with at least nine teams in violation of debt limit rule).
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direct violation of the essential facilities doctrine.19 4 Therefore, assuming that ajudge finds that McCourt did not violate the Baseball
Agreement with MLB, it is likely that McCourt could prove that
preventing his membership from MLB would unreasonably restrain
his access to an essential facility. 195
3.

Affects Interstate Commerce

The last element McCourt must prove under a section 1 claim
is that this unreasonable restraint affects interstate commerce.1 9 6
Given the Court's recent history of interpreting the effects baseball
has on interstate commerce, it can almost be guaranteed that any
court would find that McCourt's removal from ownership affects
interstate commerce. 19 7
IV.

BASEBALL

Is

EXEMPTION

NOT AN ANOMALY:

IS

WHY

ABOLISHING THE

IN EVERYONE'S 'BEST INTERESTS'

A.

Rule of Law

Much of the conflict between Frank McCourt and Bud Selig
stems from MLB being almost completely exempted from the rule
of law.198 Thus, Bud Selig is able to legislate, execute, and adjudicate the private rules of baseball without concern for any anticompetitive effects that might stem from his actions.1 99 While some
owners and other baseball insiders argue profusely for the exemption's existence, more often than not the exemption hinders owners on an individual basis. 2 00 Applying the rule of law (i.e. the
Sherman Act) to MLB owners would not only give owners an incentive to offer more competitive and reasonable employment terms to
194. See Piraino, supra note 110, at 1689 (characterizing essential facilities as
"any joint ventures which control a non-duplicable resource to which access is necessary in order to compete effectively in a relevant market.").
195. See id, at 1689 n.49 (asserting that exclusion from essential facilities can
only be made on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms).
196. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 564 (noting third prima facie element
that must be proven under Rule of Reason analysis).
197. See Macaluso, supra note 58, at 467 (commenting on Court's expansion
of commerce clause jurisprudence since Federal Baseball).
198. See Nathanson, supra note 55, at 5-6 (discussing uncertainty in scope of
exemption and its application to antitrust laws). But see Macaluso, supra note 58, at
481 (reasoning since Flood Act only focused on reserve clause, all other parts of
MLB are still subject to exemption).
199. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 179-81 (listing Selig's attempts to expand
power of commissioner's office and his inability to act impartially).
200. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1246 (expressing benefits of exemption
for owners collectively, but how it often hinders owners individually when they are
pitted against other owners or against commissioner).
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players, but it would protect individual owners who are not members of Selig's inner circle of friends.2 0 It would also place a muchneeded check on the arbitrary and discretionary power of the
commissioner.2 0 2
One argument often made by owners and the commissioner in
favor of the exemption is the protection it provides for the unique
and anomalous nature of MLB's minor league system.20 3 The exemption currently restricts minor leaguers from negotiating multimillion dollar salaries. 2 04 Most of the expert opinion on the issue
contends that the minor leagues would still survive even without the
exemption.2 0 5 However, considering that the minor league system
was a driving force behind the narrow and precise language of the
Flood Act, it is unlikely the exemption will be lifted for minor
league baseball anytime soon. 20 6
Many advocates of baseball's antitrust exemption cite the doctrine of stare decisis and Congressional action, or positive inaction,

when arguing for the continued existence of the exception. 207
Overruling this judicially-created exemption, however, would not
be the first time the Supreme Court overruled an archaic antitrust
holding. 208 In fact, it was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes himself 201. See, e.g., Ken Rosenthal & Jon Paul Morosi, Selig's Relationship With Mets
Owner Key, Fox SPORTS (Feb. 10, 2011, 5:58 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/
story/bud-selig-wont-touch-new-york-mets-mess-021011 (describing Selig's close relationship with Mets owner Frank Wilpon, and favorable treatment he has given
him even in light of Wilpon's involvement with Madoff scandal); see Bill Shaikin,
Dodgers Seek MLB Details, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2011, at 5 (comparing Selig's "abusive
conduct" toward Dodgers and his "velvet glove" treatment toward Mets). For a
discussion regarding the exemption and how it creates disincentives for owners
from to offer more competitive and reasonable employment terms to players, see
Macaluso, supra note 58, at 474-75 (noting leverage exemption gives owners at
bargaining table and how it discourages them from accepting reasonable terms).
202. See Lamme, supra note 29, at 181 (calling for integrity and independence
from commissioner's office).
203. See Sullivan, supra note 74, at 1300 (discussing debate surrounding future
of minor league system and whether antitrust exemption should be abandoned).
204. See Macaluso, supra note 58, at 479 (noting this type of control over minor leaguers may be beneficial because it is one less thing MLB clubs have to worry
about).
205. See Sullivan, supra note 74, at 1300 (arguing that effect on minor league
system would be minimal); see Tomlinson, supra note 55, at 296-97 (advocating for
abolishing exemption and that this would have little to no effect on minor league
baseball).
206. See Macaluso, supra note 58, at 479 (commenting on congressmen who
stressed importance of minor league baseball and having it remain exempted,
even though none gave substantial reasons in support).
207. See Sullivan, supra note 74, at 1267 (referring to Court's aversion to overturning decision that Congress allowed to exist for many years).
208. See Gillies, supra note 74, at 645 (detailing Court's reversal of ninety-six
year old precedent in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.). For a
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the creator of the 90 year old baseball antitrust exemption - who
once wrote,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.2 09
Not only is the concept of interstate commerce outdated from the
time of Federal Baseball, but the game has also evolved into much
more of a national, and even international, spectacle since the
1920s. 2 10 Therefore, rule of law arguments in favor of precedent
should yield to antitrust laws that all businesses and industries are
required to follow.
B.

Economic Efficiency

Another justification for abolishing baseball's antitrust exemption is economic efficiency. By isolating baseball from market
forces, the owners and Commissioner are able to extort large sums
of money through collaboration. 2 11 Similar to the way baseball emphasizes on-field competition, capitalism also requires competition
to operate efficiently. 2 1 2 If one team on the field gets two extra outs
an inning, or only has to throw one strike to get a batter out, fans
would be outraged over the unfairness of the game. 2 13 Likewise,
when the commissioner and the owners are not subject to the same
discussion of other cases that have been overturned after many years of existence,
see generally Fein, supra note 67 (discussing multitude of cases that were overturned in antitrust law).
209. See Fein, supra note 67 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and his
book, The Path of Law).
210. See Sullivan, supra note 74, at 1267 (arguing that obsolete factual conditions and wealth of scholarly criticism should induce Court to overturn antitrust
exemption).
211. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1248 (noting exorbitant amount owners
and MLB charge expansion franchises). Tampa Bay and Arizona each had to pay
$130 million to enter the league, when thirty-six years earlier the Mariners and
Blue Jays only paid $5.2 million for an expansion draft. See Jerome Holtzman,
Expansion Draft No Joke Anymore, CHICAGO TIUBUNE (Nov. 13, 1997), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-11-13/sports/9 7 11130100_1_expansion-new-owners-clubs (indicating low value of franchise verses high cost of entrance fee).
212. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1249 (arguing that off-field competition
should coincide with on-field competition).
213. See id. (noting how fans would not put up with unfair competition in
games, and therefore, they should not have to put up with unfair marketplace
competition either).
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rules of the marketplace as other businesses, fans pay the price. 2 1 4
Whether it is through ticket sales, merchandise, or MLB TV, fans the American consumers - are the ones who suffer at the end of the
day.2 15
While there are strong arguments for repealing baseball's antitrust exemption because of economic competition off the field,
some argue that without an exemption, on-field competition will
suffer.2 16 Proponents of the exemption argue that by receiving leeway from antitrust liability, MLB is able to provide the public with a
good product and competitive league.2 1 7 For owners stuck in small
market cities who experience financial difficulties, however, it is almost impossible for them to move to other cities and possibly improve financially because other owners can collude to block the
moving of a franchise. 21 8 This is contrary to the National Football
League ("NFL"), where teams may relocate to new homes that provide bigger and richer fan bases. 2 19 The antitrust exemption in
baseball discriminates against small market owners, preventing
them from relocating to baseball-friendlier cities. 22 0 By abolishing
214. See Brittany Van Roo, One Trilogy that Should Go Without a Sequel: Why the
Baseball Antitrust Exemption Should be Repealed, 21 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REv. 381, 401
(2010) (asserting increased prices fans pay for MLB exclusive agreements with
ticket sale organizations like StubHub that would probably violate antitrust laws
with exemption). "Professional baseball can no longer be divided into sport and
business, and as such, especially with the materialization of MLB's deal with
StubHub, a repeal of the antitrust exemption should be considered." Id.
215. See Policy Debate: Should the Antitrust Exemption for Baseball be Eliminated?,
ECONOMICs RESOURCE CENTER (2006), http://www.swlearning.com/economics/
policy-debates/baseball.html (commenting on how antitrust exemption increases
ticket prices and allows individual teams to extort money for construction or reconstruction of new stadiums); see Fein, supra note 67 (detailing astronomical revenues for industry with little to antitrust regulation).
216. See Macaluso, supra note 58, at 471-72 (asserting that league where competitiveness is tied to success of all members needs exemptions from antitrust liability to operate well).
217. See id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
94 (1984)) (arguing that certain degree of cooperation is required to preserve and
enhance competition).
218. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1249-50 (stating that owners who want to
move to another city may not be able to do so because of collusion from owners
who want to stifle competition for their own best interests).
219. See David Greenberg, Baseball's Con Game, SLATE, 2 (July 19, 2002, 10:36
7
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/history_1esson/2002/0 /
baseballs con-game.2.html (noting that before move of Montreal Expos, no baseball team had changed locations in over thirty years).
220. See id. (asserting that baseball's antitrust exemption is economically unfair to small market owners). This is arguably worse for the competitive balance of
the game because MLB is forcing a franchise to remain in an undesirable situation
that is not in the best interests of the team, league, or public. See Mozes and
Glicksman, supra note 31, at 278 (questioning why MLB is in better position than
local franchise to determine what is in its "best interests).
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the exemption, cities that place a high value on baseball would be
able to attract additional teams in response to consumer
demand.2 21
C.

Preventing Another McCourt v. Selig

With the abolishment of baseball's antitrust exemption, MLB
will be treated as a business that offers one product in a two-sided
market.22 2 This product, the access to on-field competition, is in
the middle of a two-sided market where MLB is the intermediary
between the fans and the players and owners.2 23 By viewing MLB as
a member of a marketplace and not an anomaly of the business
world, the rule of law will protect the interests of the people on
each side of the marketplace - those of the fans, and those of the
players and owners.2 24 Thus, there will be an incentive to exclude
potential members who initially do not meet requirements, instead
of retroactively expelling them from their position in the marketplace as Selig did with McCourt.2 25
Furthermore, once individuals are members of the marketplace, antitrust laws will ensure a fair and uniform application of
rules across the board. 22 6 No longer will there be a wildly subjective
"best interests of baseball" rule that changes depending on whether
the subject is the commissioner's friend or foe. 2 2 7 Bud Selig and
any subsequent commissioner would have to abide by antitrust laws
and not unreasonably restrain individuals from accessing the
221. See Policy Debate: Should the Antitrust Exemption for Baseball be Eliminated ,
supra note 215 (advocating for abolishing exemption because it would prevent
problem of teams leaving cities if city does not provide a new or rebuilt stadium).
222. See Salil K. Mehra & T. Joel Zuercher, Striking Out Competitive Balance in
Sports, Antitrust, and IntellectualProperty, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1499, 1541-42 (2006)
(arguing there is no reason why sports leagues should be treated differently from
other industries that involve organized labor and cooperation between economically competing entities)
223. See id. at 1527-29 (describing concept of two-sided market).
224. See id. at 1526-27 (stating that market forces and rule of law can place
efficient checks on system).
225. See Helyar & Soshnick, supra note 61 (noting baseball violated its own
financial rules by approving McCourt's $421 million purchase of Dodgers "entirely
with borrowed funds"). When he allowed McCourt to purchase the Dodgers on
borrowed money, Selig was reported as saying, "[t]here's no doubt in my mind he
will be a good owner of a very storied franchise." Id.
226. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1252-53 (arguing it's imperative that
courts or congress abolish antitrust exemption so MLB can operate under uniform
system of laws without having to rely on uncertain precedents).
227. See Morath, supra note 166 (commenting on Selig's discretionary use of
his powers).
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league, moving a franchise, or trading a player. 228 Therefore, a repeat of McCourt v. Selig with a different owner and commissioner
would be unlikely.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Frank McCourt will probably go down in sports history as one
of the most notorious owners to ever own a professional
franchise. 229 He has been vilified by fans, the media, MLB, his former wife, and just about anyone who has any interest in Hollywood
or baseball.23 0 McCourt probably did not even deserve the opportunity to own the Dodgers in the first place.23 1 But unfortunately
for MLB, Bud Selig and the other owners allowed him to join their
exclusive country club. 2 3 2 Moreover, they acquiesced to his membership knowing that his only collateral for the primary loan he
used to buy the Dodgers was a twenty-four acre parking lot in Boston.2 33 These same people remained silent when he started dividing the Chavez Ravine properties around Dodger Stadium into
separate businesses to provide more cash flow and to position himself as the landlord for the next Dodgers owner. 234
228. See Gillerman, supra note 47, at 560-63 (defining what constitutes unreasonable restraints on trade and how to assess whether restraints fall in this
category).
229. See Gallagher, supra note 3 (describing why MLB does not like Frank
McCourt); see Mead, supra note 2 (advocating for McCourt to walk away from game
because no fan will ever like him again).
230. See Mead, supra note 2 (discussing everyone who does not like Frank McCourt); Kim, Goffard, & Weikel, supra note 28 (discussing amount of public scorn
McCourt has received and how he is one of the most disliked people in baseball
and Hollywood).
231. See Helyar & Soshnick, supra note 61 (noting McCourt bought Dodgers
with borrowed funds and leveraged pieces of property to get loans approved).
232. See Helyar & Soshnick, supra note 61 (stating that Selig knowingly approved of McCourt's purchase of Dodgers); Ozanian, supra note 70 (recalling Selig's knowledge that McCourt bought team with leveraged assets and loaned
money).
233. See Larry Behrendt, Frank McCourt Must Go, IT's ABOUT THE MONEY (June
21, 2011), http://itsaboutthemoney.net/archives/2011/06/21/commissioner-selig-frank-mccourt-must-go-a-petition/ (describing McCourt's purchase of
Dodgers).
234. See If McCourt Can't Play Ball in Chavez Ravine Maybe He Will Build Houses
Instead, EASTSIDER IA (May 10, 2011), http://www.theeastsiderla.com/2011/05/iffrank-mccourt-cant-play-ball-in-chavez-ravine-maybe-he-will-build-houses-instead/
(noting that McCourt divided team and stadium property into separate companies
on MLB's watch). The parking lots generate $11 million per year. See id. (discussing McCourt's landlord income). However, because the finalized sale of the Dodgers includes the land around Dodger Stadium, McCourt will not reap any future
profits from the parking lots. See Ramona Shelburne, McCourt Gets No ParkingLot
Money, ESPN (Mar. 29, 2012, 10:08 PM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/mlb/
story/_/id/7752934/frank-mccourt-receives-no-parking-revenue-los-angeles-dodg-
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McCourt has a strong argument that he complied with all MLB
rules and regulations, especially considering MLB treatment toward
the finances of other teams. 23 5 With rule of law, economic efficiency, and greater uniformity arguments favoring the abolition of
baseball's antitrust exemption, McCourt could have been in a persuasive position to challenge MLB's authority if he had not instead
succumbed to a settlement with the league. While McCourt's financial decisions are undoubtedly questionable at best, living on a thin
line is different than living in violation of the rules. It goes against
the American philosophy of a free market and open competition to
permit a captain of industry (i.e. Bud Selig), who is exempted from
antitrust laws, to threaten to take someone's business when it is not
clear that any rules have been broken.23 6 Nobody may like Frank
McCourt, but nobody likes to be on the receiving end of anticompetitive practices either.
John W Polonis*
ers-sources-say (indicating ownership group paid McCourt $150 million just for
land around Dodger Stadium, including parking lots, and rights to control it).
235. See Ozanian, supra note 70 (finding that McCourt is not in violation of
any MLB financial rules); Shaikin, supra note 155 (documenting widespread debt
problem in MLB).
236. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1249-50, 1254 (discussing capitalism underpinnings of economy and why baseball needs to fall in line).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Washington State University, 2010.
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